检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:郎玲玲 刘峥[1,2] 徐琪[3] LANG Lingling;LIU Zheng;XU Qi(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China;Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China;Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)
机构地区:[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海201620 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200240 [3]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051
出 处:《东华大学学报(自然科学版)》2021年第3期120-128,共9页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)
基 金:国家社会科学基金青年资助项目(18CGL015)。
摘 要:基于供应链制造商的高碳减排成本,考虑零售商为制造商投资进行合作减排,在消费者低碳偏好下,建立制造商和零售商之间的博弈模型,对制造商是否减排、零售商是否投资时的供应链最优决策进行对比。研究发现,消费者对低碳产品的偏好行为可以使制造商和零售商的利润都有所增加,但是会出现零售商"搭便车"现象,而零售商投资减排后能消除这一现象。碳减排量和线上线下产品价格都会随零售商投资比例的增加而增加,当零售商投资达到一定比例时,可以实现制造商和零售商双方的利益最大化。Based on the high carbon emission reduction cost of supply chain manufacturers,considering the retailer s investment for manufacturers to carry out cooperative emission reduction,a game model between manufacturers and retailers is established under the low carbon preference of consumers.The optimal decision-making of supply chain are compared under the circumstances of whether manufacturers reduce emissions and whether retailers invest.It is found that consumers preference for low-carbon products can increase the profits of both manufacturers and retailers,but there will be more profits for retailers than for manufacturers,which can be eliminated after investment of retailers.Carbon emission reduction and online and offline product prices will increase with the increase of retailer investment proportion.When the retailer s investment reaches a certain proportion,it can maximize the benefits of both manufacturers and retailers.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.4