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作 者:苏贵影[1] 张玮 张娜 SU Guiying;ZHANG Wei;ZHANG Na(College of Economics and Management,North University of China,Taiyuan 030051,China)
出 处:《河南科学》2021年第6期1004-1016,共13页Henan Science
基 金:山西省软科学研究计划项目(2019041035-5)。
摘 要:为研究公平关切信息不对称对绿色供应链最优决策的影响,将零售商销售努力内化,构建零售商无公平关切、公平关切信息私有、公平关切信息共享3种供应链决策模型,并对均衡结果进行分析.研究表明:零售商公平关切行为对系统成员决策变量产生不利影响;系统成员决策变量取决于制造商公平关切系数预估值,预估值越高,制造商议价能力越弱,其行为趋于保守,绿色动机极大地削弱,绿色产品边际利润最低;零售商选择公平关切信息私有不总有益,零售商真实公平关切系数越低,信息私有对自身越有价值,否则相反.只有满足一定条件,零售商在公平关切信息不对称才会有利于零售商和供应链整体的效用.In order to study the impact of fairness concern information asymmetry on the optimal decision-making of the green supply chain,the retailer’s sales efforts were internalized,and three supply chain decision-making models were constructed for retailers without fairness concern,fairness concern about information private,and fairness concern about information sharing.The equilibrium results were analyzed.Research shows as follows.Retailers fairness concern behaviour adversely affects system members decision variables.System members decision variables depend on the estimated value of manufacturers fairness concern coefficients.The higher the estimated value is,the weaker the manufacturers bargaining power becomes,and their behaviour tends to be conservative.The green incentive is greatly diminished and the marginal profit of green products is lowest.Retailers choice of fairness concern information is not always beneficial.As the retailers true fairness concern coefficients reduce the value of information privatization to itself increases and vice versa.Only if certain conditions are met,information asymmetries of fairness concern would benefit the effectiveness of the retailer and the whole supply chain.
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