考虑联盟结构的联合采购合作剩余分配博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Surplus Allocation of Joint PurchasingCooperation Considering Alliance Structure

作　　者：杨洁[1] 赖礼邦 YANG Jie;LAI Li-bang(College of Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;Fujian Chuanzheng Communications College,Fuzhou 350007,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学管理学院,福建福州350002 [2]福建船政交通职业学院,福建福州350007

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第6期91-95,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(19YJC630201);博士后科学基金面上项目(227348);福建省自然科学基金(2020J01589);福建省高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划项目(K80SCC55A)。

摘　　要：联合采购合作剩余分配本质是在最大联盟剩余值与最小期望分配值之间的谈判协商过程。当前联合采购合作剩余分配研究主要基于参与企业地位无差别假设,忽略了联盟结构对剩余分配具有明显影响。基于联盟形成的层次结构,研究论证了采购企业通过组建小联盟形式参与更大联盟的联合采购,可提升其在分配谈判中的话语权。通过算例分析表明,考虑联盟结构的联合采购合作剩余分配相对于不考虑联盟结构得到的分配方案更具公平性和合理性。The essence of cooperative surplus allocation in joint purchasing is the negotiation process between the maximum alliance surplus values and the minimum expected values.The current research on surplus distribution in joint purchasing mainly based on players’statuses is the same,which ignores the significant effect of the alliance structure.Based on the hierarchical structure of the alliance,we find that players can improve the bargaining power in the distribution negotiation if they take part in the bigger joint purchasing alliance by forming a small alliance in advance.By an example,it is shown that the cooperation surplus allocation in joint purchasing considering alliance structure is fairer and more reasonable than the allocation scheme that does not consider the alliance structure.

关 键 词：联合采购 收益分配 合作博弈 联盟结构 τ值 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]