国资监管职能转变与央企高管薪酬业绩敏感性  

Transformation of State-owned Assets Supervision Function and Executive Compensation Performance Sensitivity in Central Enterprises

作　　者：卜君 孙光国 BU Jun;SUN Guang-guo(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian,Liaoning,116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《经济管理》2021年第6期117-135,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金青年项目“辽宁省上市公司质量提升研究:路径依赖与评价体系”(L20CGL008)

摘　　要：国有资产监管职能从以管企业为主向以管资本为主转变是当前国资国企改革的重大举措。国资委自2014年开始逐步通过改组组建国有资本投资运营公司,对央企实施“以管资本为主”的试点改革。基于这一准自然实验,本文从高管薪酬契约视角出发考察了国资监管职能转变的经济后果,采用2010-2018年沪深A股央企上市公司数据,结果发现:受到国资监管职能转变影响的试点央企高管薪酬业绩敏感性更高,且在股权集中度更高、金字塔层级更短的公司中更加明显,该结论在一系列稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步检验发现,对于那些政策性负担更大、代理问题更严重、受到薪酬管制更小的试点央企,其薪酬业绩敏感性在国资监管职能转变后的提升效应更加显著。上述结论不仅从高管薪酬契约的视角为新一轮国有企业改革有效性提供了经验证据,也为如何进一步推动国有企业高管薪酬体制的改进与完善提供了新的可行路径。The transformation of the supervision function of state-owned assets from managing enterprises to managing capital is a major measure in the reform of state-owned assets and enterprises.In this context, the specific means of reform is to reorganize and set up state-owned capital investment and operation companies(also known as "two types of companies"),and to classify the matters that should be operated and decided by enterprises according to law into enterprises.According to the reform guidelines, the state-owned assets supervision institutions shall, in accordance with law, perform the functions of investor to state-owned capital investment and operation companies and other enterprises under direct supervision, and authorize the state-owned capital investment and operation companies to perform the functions of investor to state-owned enterprises within the scope of authorization.The three-level supervision system of "State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission-State-owned Capital Investment and Operation Company-State-owned Enterprise" will be formed through reorganization and establishment of state-owned capital investment and operation company.By establishing the dominant position of state-owned enterprises in the market, it is helpful to solve the problem of no distinction between government and enterprises, between government and capital.On the one hand, by reducing the political intervention faced by state-owned enterprises and reducing the policy burden borne by enterprises, the reform will put the state-owned listed companies back into the competition of the market participants, and provide a good competitive environment for the management’s efforts and compensation to be more closely combined;On the other hand, the State owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC),which performs the function of capital contribution, is separated from the listed companies by the state-owned capital investment and operation companies.The SASAC focuses on examining the operation ability

关 键 词：国资监管职能转变 管资本 国有资本投资运营公司 薪酬-业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]