不同公平关切下关税与补贴对跨国生产决策的影响  

The Impact of Tariff and Export Subsidy on Transnational Production under Different Fairness Concerns

作　　者：伏开放 FU Kaifang(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China)

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院工商管理学院,广东广州510521

出　　处：《物流科技》2021年第7期109-113,共5页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2020A1515110500);广州市哲学社科规划2020年度课题项目(2020GZGJ163);广东省教育厅创新强校工程广东省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地项目“战略新兴产业共性技术政策与管理创新研究中心”(2018WZJD007);广东省普通高校青年创新人才类资助项目(2018WQNCX125,2018WQNCX277)。

摘　　要：将公平关切引入到跨国供应链斯坦科尔伯格博弈问题中,依次建立了制造商无公平关切、存在绝对公平关切和相对公平关切情形下的跨国主从博弈模型。定量分析了公平关切指数、关税税率和出口补贴率对订购量、离岸价及跨国供应链各方利润的影响。研究表明公平关切行为不影响制造商的订购量,但会影响供应商制定离岸价。制造商效应随公平关切指数的增加而增加,供应商效应随公平关切指数的增加而减少。制造商更加偏爱绝对公平关切,供应商更加偏爱相对公平关切。The fairness concern is introduced into the Stackelberg game of transnational supply chain.The transnational master-slave game models with no fairness concern,absolute fairness concern and relative fairness concern are established.This paper quantitatively analyzes the effects of fairness concern index,tariff rate and export subsidy rate on order quantity,FOB and profits of all parties in transnational supply chain.The results show that fair concern behavior does not affect the manufacturer's order quantity,but affects the supplier's FOB price.The manufacturer effect increases with the increase of fairness concern index,while the supplier effect decreases with the increase of fairness concern index.Manufacturers prefer absolute fairness,while suppliers prefer relative fairness.

关 键 词：公平关切 跨国生产 关税 出口补贴 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]