零售商补贴对供应链可靠性协调策略影响研究  

The impact of retailer subsidy on supply chain reliability coordination strategy

作　　者：王海军[1] 张瑞娜[1] 郭羽洪 杨明 WANG Haijun;ZHANG Ruina;GUO Yuhong;YANG Ming(School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;Hubei Tobacco Monopoly Administration,Wuhan 430030,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]湖北省烟草专卖局(公司),湖北武汉430030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第4期190-201,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372135)。

摘　　要：本文建立以零售商为领导者、供应商为追随者的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商对可靠性建设成本、备用生产成本分别补贴或同时补贴对供应链可靠性的影响。零售商决策补贴金额、中断之前的订货量;供应商决策供应链可靠性,是否启用备用生产线以及供应链中断之后的最优供货量。通过对比发现,对备用生产成本补贴会降低供应链可靠性水平,相反对可靠性建设成本补贴会提高可靠性水平;存在市场规模,使得零售商同时补贴策略并不能有效提高供应链可靠性、供应商利润。结果表明,对可靠性补贴,市场规模小,零售商同时补贴策略低于零售商仅对可靠性建设成本补贴策略;但市场规模大,结果相反。且随着市场规模的增加,零售商仅对可靠性成本补贴时对零售商、供应链会更加有效。Supply chain disruption is a major challenge for many supply chain management companies.Natural disasters such as floods in Thailand and earthquakes in Japan have caused supply chain disruptions in many companies,causing huge losses to the middle and lower reaches of the supply chain.At present,scholars have studied strategies to deal with supply chain disruption,including direct subsidies,multi-source procurement,backup procurement,reserve stock,etc.,and compared and analyzed the differences between different coordination strategies.However,there are still few studies on the comparative analysis of retailer direct subsidies and spare production subsidies,especially the difference between subsidies before and after supply chain disruption.This paper studies the supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer,and there is a risk of supply chain interruption.We investigate the impact of supply chain reliability coordination when the retailer subsidizes reliability construction cost and backup production separately or simultaneously.In this paper,a Stackelberg game model is established in which the retailer as the leader decides the amount of subsidies for the reliability construction and the spare production cost,and the order quantity before the disruption;Supplier as the follower decides the reliability of supply chain,whether to use backup production line and the optimal supply quantity after supply chain disruption.Under different subsidy strategies of retailers,the optimal decisions of retailer and supplier change with the changes of market size and their respective profit functions.At first,this paper constructs a model of retailer’s coordination of supplier reliability cost subsidies before supply chain interruption.It can be seen that when the market size is relatively small or large,retailers will not subsidize suppliers,and the reliability level of the supply chain increases with the increase of the market size.Then the model of the retailer subsidizing the supplier’s backup production cost after

关 键 词：供应链中断 供应链可靠性 可靠性建设成本 备用生产成本 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]