经理自主权与管理层盈余预告准确度——基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究  

Managerial Discretion and Management Earnings Forecasts Accuracy--Empirical Research on Chinese A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：谢获宝[1] 林灿 Xie Huobao;Lin Can(Economics and Management School of Wuhan University,Wuhan,430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《珞珈管理评论》2021年第2期60-79,共20页Luojia Management Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(项目批准号:19YJA630093);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目号:413000182)。

摘　　要：本文利用2008—2017年中国A股上市公司的数据,研究了经理自主权对管理层盈余预告准确度的影响,并进一步研究了其中的影响机理和作用环境。研究结果表明:公司的经理自主权越大,其管理层盈余预告的准确度越低。按管理层盈余预告类型进行分组检验的结果显示,经理自主权对管理层盈余预告准确度的负面影响仅在强制披露组显著,在自愿披露组不显著。影响机理检验表明,经理自主权主要通过增加管理层代理成本和加大信息不对称程度来降低管理层盈余预告准确度。作用环境的分析与检验表明,在管理者过度自信、内部控制质量差、分析师关注度低、地区社会信任水平低的公司,经理自主权对管理层盈余预告准确度的负面影响更明显。本文对经理自主权对管理层盈余预告质量的影响进行了理论分析和实证检验,对中国上市公司信息披露监管具有启示性意义。Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017,this paper researches the impact of managerial discretion on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts,and further studies the mechanism and environment of the impact.The findings are shown that the greater the managerial discretion of a company,the lower the accuracy of its earnings forecast.According to the group test of the types of management earnings forecasts,the negative effect of managerial discretion on the accuracy of management earnings forecast is only significant in the mandatory disclosure group,but not in the voluntary disclosure group.The impact mechanism test shows that managerial discretion reduces the accuracy of earnings forecast by increasing the agency cost of management and aggravating the degree of information asymmetry.Further,the analysis and test of environmental effects show that in the companies with overconfident managers,poor quality of internal control,weak coverage of analysts and low level of regional social trust,the negative impact of managerial discretion on the accuracy of earnings forecast is greater.This paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of managerial discretion on the quality of management earnings forecasts,which has enlightening significance for the supervision of information disclosure of Listed Companies in China.

关 键 词：经理自主权 管理层盈余预告准确度 管理层代理成本 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]