股权结构、薪酬激励与企业经营效率理论分析与实证检验  

Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test of Ownership Structure,Sala⁃ry Incentives and Business Efficiency

作　　者：谢红梅 XIE Hongmei(Guangdong Industry and Commerce Vocational Technical University,Guangdong Zhaoqing 526000,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工商职业技术大学,广东肇庆526040

出　　处：《保山学院学报》2021年第3期66-71,共6页JOURNAL OF BAOSHAN UNIVERSITY

摘　　要：利用A股上市的1 388家企业的2000-2019年数据为研究对象,探究股权结构、薪酬激励与企业经营效率之间的关联性,结果显示:上市公司的管理层股份占比提升与公司经营效率之间为明显的正相关关系,即股权结构与公司经营效率之间为明显的正相关关系;薪酬激励能够促使企业经营效率提升,对管理层进行适当的薪酬激励,使管理层努力工作,能够提升管理层的管理信心,促使公司经营效率提升;公司规模、高管规模以及公司年龄等对公司经营效率提升具有积极作用,而资产负债率提升抑制了公司经营效率提升。This paper uses the data of 1388 enterprises listed in 2000-2019 to explore the correlation between ownership structure,salary incentive and business efficiency.The results show that the obvi⁃ous positive correlation between the improvement of the management ratio and the operating efficiency of the company,that is,the obvious positive correlation between the ownership structure and the operat⁃ing efficiency of the company.Salary incentive can promote the operating efficiency of enterprises,pro⁃vide appropriate salary incentive to management,so that management can work hard,improve manage⁃ment’s confidence,and promote the operating efficiency of the company.The size of the company,the size of senior executives and the age of the company play a positive role in the improvement of the com⁃pany’s operating efficiency,and the improvement of the asset-liability ratio has inhibited the improve⁃ment of the company’s operating efficiency.

关 键 词：股权结构 薪酬激励 经营效率 净资产收益率 托宾Q 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]