CEO任期与企业融资约束  

A Research on CEO Tenure and Corporate Financing Constraints

作　　者：程安林[1] 刘杨冰儿 CHENG Anlin;LIU Yangbinger(School of Accounting,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海201620

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2021年第4期51-60,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(12YJA790015)。

摘　　要：在我国转型经济和独特的制度背景下,以2009—2019年我国深沪两市A股上市公司数据为样本,对CEO任期与企业融资约束之间的关系展开实证研究,发现CEO任期长度对企业融资约束具有负向作用。进一步按照股权性质、产品市场竞争、CEO年龄将样本进行分组,发现CEO任期对企业融资约束的负向作用在非国有企业、产品市场竞争较强、年长CEO的样本组内更显著。研究成果有助于企业依据不同情境合理配置和发挥CEO职能,也为政府部门和金融机构制定和完善缓解企业融资难的相关政策提供了经验依据。Under the background of China's transitional economy and unique system,this paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2009 to 2019 as samples to conduct an empirical study on the relationship between CEO tenure and corporate financing constraints,and finds that CEO tenure length has a negative effect on corporate financing constraints.Further grouping the samples according to the nature of equity,product market competition and CEO age,the research finds that the negative effect of CEO tenure on corporate financing constraints is more significant in the sample group of non-state-owned enterprises,stronger product market competition and older CEOs.The research results are helpful for enterprises to reasonably allocate and play CEO functions according to different situations,and also provide empirical basis for government departments and financial institutions to formulate and improve relevant policies to alleviate the financing difficulties of enterprises.

关 键 词：融资约束 CEO任期 股权性质 产品市场竞争 经营风险 人力资本 调节效应 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]