信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调  

Coordination of closed supply chain under asymmetric information considering manufacturer’s recycling behavior

作　　者：王道平[1] 梁思涵 王婷婷 WANG Dao-ping;LIANG Si-han;WANG Ting-ting(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《控制与决策》2021年第7期1723-1731,共9页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71871017);北京市教委社科基金项目(SM201910037004)。

摘　　要：研究信息非对称下考虑制造商回收行为的闭环供应链协调问题,其中回收率随时间动态变化,制造商的再造品成本为私有信息.通过构建分散决策模型,得到制造商与零售商的最优均衡解,并引入批发价格契约以促使制造商传递真实的成本信息.运用伊藤过程刻画回收率的随机演化过程,通过数值仿真分析信息隐匿度和回收率等参数对供应链的影响.研究表明:回收率在较短时间内能够达到稳定值,并受不确定因素影响在稳定值上下波动.外部激励比外部约束措施更能提升回收率.信息隐匿会降低制造商的回收率和公开利润以及零售商利润,批发价格契约的引入可有效提高供应链成员利润,减小分散决策和信息非对称带来的损失,使供应链实现帕累托改进.The paper studies the closed supply chain coordination considering the manufacturer’s recycling behavior under asymmetric information. The recovery rate changes dynamically with time and the manufacturer’s remanufactured cost information is privates. By constructing a decentralized decision model, the optimal equilibrium solution is obtained and the wholesale price contract is introduced to prompt the manufacturer to transmit the real cost information. The stochastic evolution process of recovery rate is described by using Ito process. The influence of parameters such as information hiding degree and recovery rate on the supply chain are analyzed by numerical simulation. Studies show that the recovery rate reaches a stable value in a short period of time, which fluctuates around the stable value because of the uncertainty fluctuates. External incentives improve recovery rates more than external constraints. Information concealment will reduce manufacturer’s recycling rate and public profit and retailer’s profit. The wholesale price contract can effectively improve the profit of supply chain members, reduce the loss caused by decentralized decision-making and information asymmetry, and achieve a Pareto improvement.

关 键 词：信息非对称 动态回收率 制造商回收 批发价格契约 闭环供应链 伊藤过程 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]