外部大股东能促进企业创新吗——基于退出威胁视角的实证分析  

Can Outside Blockholders Promote Corporate Innovation?An Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Exit Threats

作　　者：陈克兢[1] 康艳玲 万清清 刘琪[2] Chen Kejing;Kang Yanling;Wan Qingqing;Liu Qi(School of Accounting,Northeast University of Finance and Economics;Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院 [2]中南财经政法大学收入分配与现代财政学科创新引智基地

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2021年第3期202-212,I0038,I0039,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71802043);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(18YJC630007);辽宁省教育厅青年科技人才“育苗”项目(LN2019Q05)资助。

摘　　要：传统文献重点关注外部大股东发挥公司治理作用的"用手投票"和"用脚投票"行为,而对退出威胁的公司治理效应关注不足。本文检验了外部大股东退出威胁与企业创新的关系,分析了退出威胁影响企业创新的作用机理,并考察了外生流动性冲击在其中发挥的调节效应。研究发现:外部大股东退出威胁可以有效地促进企业的创新投入和产出,在控制内生性问题之后依然稳健;长期战略型外部大股东退出威胁的治理效应更为显著,而短期逐利型外部大股东退出威胁的治理效应则较弱;退出威胁通过减少控股股东掏空行为对企业创新产生治理效应;放松卖空管制可以增强退出威胁对企业创新的治理效应,而加强大股东减持管制则会削弱退出威胁对企业创新的治理效应。本文从退出威胁的角度验证了外部大股东公司治理作用的有效性,为外部大股东参与公司决策和完善公司治理提供了参考依据。The traditional corporate governance literature has focused on the role of outside blockholders’ blind voting, lacking concerns on the effect of corporate governance on their exit threat. Recently, the international financial and accounting circles have formed some research results around the exit threat. According to the exit threat governance theory, the exit threat of blockholders can effectively alleviate the agency problem. Threat is an effective means of communication during the game, which helps to promote negotiation and reach a consensus during the process of the game. Before blind voting, outside blockholders often conduct exit threat as a bargaining chip for negotiations with insiders. Only when the exit threat is invalid will the outside blockholders choose bind voting. In reality, many cases can be introduced to interpret the governance chain of outside blockholders. However, inconsistent with the practical application of corporate governance, the academic literature focusing on the exit threat of outside blockholders is relatively rare.On the one hand, this paper believes that outside blockholders have the motivation to promote companies to engage in innovative activities. Compared with controlling shareholders and the management, information asymmetry faced by outside blockholders is much more serious. To avoid potential infringement of their legitimate rights and interests, outside blockholders are more willing to participate in corporate governance. Since the outside blockholders hold more stocks, they can obtain the benefits brought by the increase in the company’s value, which can be used to make up for the cost of supervision. Therefore, outside blockholders have strong motivations to actively participate in corporate governance, and they will not choose to "free ride" like small and medium shareholders. Based on the above, the growth of corporate value is particularly important for outside blockholders. Innovation is an important indicator of corporate value evaluation, companies that are

关 键 词：创新 退出威胁 外部大股东 流动性冲击 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]