认罪认罚从宽制度的法律经济学分析  

Legal Economics Analysis of Chinese Plea Bargain

作　　者：姜保忠 来宇 Jiang Baozhong;Lai Yu(School of criminal justice,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou,Henan 450046)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学刑事司法学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《河南财经政法大学学报》2021年第4期88-99,共12页Journal of Henan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：2020年最高人民检察院检察理论研究课题“正当防卫的刑事政策与法律适用研究”(项目编号:GJ2020C35);2019年河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“典型案例影响正当防卫司法认定的作用与机理研究”(项目编号:2019BFX003);2020年河南省教育厅人文社科重点项目“认罪认罚从宽制度与案件程序分流机制创新研究”(项目编号:2020-ZZJH-028)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：认罪认罚从宽制度在实践中已全面推开,传统法学研究方法在分析认罪认罚从宽制度的价值与合理性方面存在局限,经济学中的边际效益理论、博弈论方法可以为认罪认罚从宽制度提供理论支持。从经济学的视角,认罪认罚从宽制度的适用带来了社会正效益,形成控辩双方主动适用认罪认罚从宽程序的纳什均衡,提高了被追诉人预期赔偿数额。认罪认罚从宽制度的有效运行需要相关诉讼机制的完善,包括构建强制信息交换制度,采用确定刑量刑建议,建立减刑比例与被追诉人赔偿情况之间的关联机制等。Chinese Plea Bargain has been fully promoted in practice,and the traditional legal research methods have limitations in the analysis of its value and rationality.The marginal benefit theory and game theory in economics can provide theoretical support for it.From the perspective of economics,its application has brought positive social benefits,forms a Nash equilibrium in which the accuser and the accused actively apply it,and increases the expected amount of compensation of the accused.Its effective operation requires the improvement of relevant litigation mechanisms,including constructing of a compulsory information exchange system,adopting of recommendations for determining punishment and sentencing,and establishing the correlation mechanism between the commutation ratio and the compensation of the accused.

关 键 词：认罪认罚从宽 边际效益递减 成本 收益 

分 类 号：D925.2[政治法律—诉讼法学]