人关于动物是否有义务?——从康德义务论体系谈起  

Do Human Beings Have Duty Regarding Animals?Research from Kantian System of Duty

作　　者：叶骏 YE Jun(Department of Philosophy,School of Humanities,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学人文学院哲学系,北京100084

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2021年第7期78-84,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：在康德的义务论体系中,人关于动物的义务是一种间接义务,根本还是对人的直接义务。本文通过考察康德的"动物""动物性""间接义务"概念,认为康德所论述的"人对动物负有间接义务"在整个康德义务论体系中是融洽且一致的,且我们有出于自然的可传达性而对动物的同情,这可以支撑人关于动物的间接义务还原为对人的直接义务。康德关于动物的论述并不是一个容易被驳倒的弱的论证,并且是符合当下我们的道德实践。In Kant’s system of duty, human beings have indirect duties regarding animals, and it is basically direct duties to human beings. By analyzing Kant’s concepts of "animals", "the nature of animals" and "indirect duties", I give an argument that the "human beings have indirect duties regarding animals" is harmonious and consistent throughout Kant’s system of duty. We human beings’ sympathy to animals raised by our nature communicable, can support the transition from indirect duties to direct duties. Kant’s argument on animals is not a weak argument that can be easily refuted, and it is in line with our current moral practice.

关 键 词：间接义务 动物性 道德地位 可传达性 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]