代理人跨期消费决策下的有限合伙制序贯博弈均衡分析  

Sequential Game Equilibrium Analysis of Limited Partnership Based on Optimal Intertemporal Consumption Decision

作　　者：武晨 倪宣明 孙晓霞[3] 沈佳瑜 WU CHEN;NI XUANMING;SUN XIAOXIA;SHEN JIAYU(Institute of Automation,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China;School of Software and Microelectronics,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China;School of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院自动化研究所,北京100190 [2]北京大学软件与微电子学院,北京100871 [3]东北财经大学数据科学与人工智能学院,大连116025

出　　处：《应用数学学报》2021年第4期459-474,共16页Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica

基　　金：科技创新2030“新一代人工智能”重大项目(2018AAA0101001);国家自然科学基金(11801064)资助项目。

摘　　要：本文基于委托代理理论研究了代理人跨期消费决策下有限合伙制和公司制的序贯博弈均衡.本文通过比较分析两种机制博弈均衡结果得出:代理人进行最优跨期消费决策时,仅有限合伙制能发挥激励作用从而改善道德风险问题.特别地,有限合伙制可在博弈区间趋于零时达到帕累托最优.通过与公司制的对比可知,公司制不是占优机制,博弈双方不会同时选择接受公司制,但在特定条件下有限合伙制占优于公司制,因而双方会选择接受有限合伙制,有限合伙制相比于公司制更具有激励优势.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper studies the sequential game equilibria of the limited partnership system and the company system under intertemporal consumption decision-making.By comparing and analyzing the game equilibria of these two mechanisms,this paper concludes that under the influence of the agent’s intertemporal consumption decision,only the limited partnership system reinforces incentives,thus relieving the moral hazard problem.In particular,when the game interval tends to zero,the Pareto optimal is achieved.Moreover,the company system is not a dominant mechanism comparing with the limited partnership system,and both sides of the game would not agree to adopt the company system at the same time.However,under certain conditions,the limited partnership system could be a dominant mechanism,and therefore being accepted by both sides.To sum up,the limited partnership system has incentive advantages over the company system.

关 键 词：有限合伙制 委托代理问题 道德风险 序贯均衡 

分 类 号：O29[理学—应用数学]