卖空狙击与上市公司违规治理研究——基于演化博弈视角  

Research on the Attack of Short Sellers and the Illegal Activities of Listed Companies——Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：孟繁锦 王玉霞[1] Meng Fanjin;Wang Yuxia(School of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院,大连100070

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2021年第8期52-61,共10页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：境外上市中概股公司屡遭卖空,股价大跌甚至被迫退市,引发中概股整体诚信危机,相关应对措施研究与加强中概股上市公司治理至关重要。卖空机构在逐利动机驱使下对上市公司的卖空威胁客观上提高了上市公司违规行为披露的程度,其行为对上市公司的影响是多方面的。本文依据演化博弈理论以及公司治理理论,建立卖空机构行为对上市公司违规影响的演化博弈模型,演绎了这一过程中二者的策略选择过程,通过演化博弈分析,明晰了卖空机构决策行为对上市公司违规行为影响的激励机理及作用过程。研究表明,有效防范和应对来自卖空机构的狙击,我国需加强中概股上市公司治理水平,同时有效发挥证监会的监督力量,并将提高上市公司信息透明度作为着力点,加强其信息披露程度。In recent years,China concept stocks have been attacked for many times,and the stock price has plummeted or even been forced to delist,causing the integrity crisis of China concept stocks. It is very important to study the relevant measures and strengthen the corporate governance of the listed companies. Driven by profit motivation,the threat of short sellers actually improves the degree of information disclosure of listed companies,and its decision-making and behavior have many effects on listed companies. Based on the evolutionary game theory and corporate governance theory,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of the impact of short sellers’ behavior on listed companies’ illegal behavior,and deduces the strategy selection process of short sellers and listed companies. Through evolutionary game analysis,the paper clarifies the process and influence of short sellers’ behavior on listed companies’ illegal behavior. The research shows that in order to effectively prevent and respond to the attack from short sellers,China needs to strengthen the management of the listed companies,give full play to the supervision power of the CSRC,and strengthen the degree of information disclosure of listed companies.

关 键 词：卖空机构 演化博弈 中概股 公司治理 仿真分析 信息透明度 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]