大股东掏空与盈余管理关系研究——基于掏空效应引入盈余管理模型视角  

Research on the Relationship between Major Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management——From the Perspective of Introducing the Hollowing-out Effect into the Earnings Management Model

作　　者：王常青 WANG Chang-qing(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《当代金融研究》2021年第4期90-100,共11页Journal of Contemporary Financial Research

摘　　要：大股东与中小股东的利益冲突是现代企业发展过程中广泛存在的重要问题。本文基于委托代理问题与大股东掏空路径,选取2012-2019年A股上市公司数据,将大股东掏空效应引入Kothari et al.(2005)修正的Jones模型,计算应计盈余时剔除关联交易行为与资金占用的影响,比较剔除前后可操纵利润的差异,对大股东掏空与盈余管理的关系进行实证研究。鉴于大股东掏空本身对盈余管理模型计算有影响,本文的做法可以形象反映掏空对盈余管理的影响路径,即大股东通过实现关联交易和资金占用,导致可操纵应计利润减少,企业会通过其他手段进行盈余管理。另外,还考虑不同产权性质的影响,结果发现国企相对于非国企来说,以掩盖大股东掏空为动机进行应计盈余管理的动机更强。The conflict of interest between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders is an important issue that exists widely in the development of modern enterprises.Based on the principal-agent problem and the research on the tunneling path of major shareholders,this paper analyzes the relationship between the tunneling behavior of major shareholders and earnings management,and selects the 2012-2019 A-share listed companies as a sample,and introduces the tunneling effect of major shareholders into Kothari et al.2005)The revised Jones model,when calculating accrued earnings,eliminates the effects of related party transactions and capital appropriation,compares the difference in manipulable profits before and after the elimination,and uses empirical analysis to test the relationship between major shareholder tunneling and earnings management.Shareholder tunneling itself has an impact on the calculation of the earnings management model.The approach of this article can vividly reflect the path of the tunneling influence on earnings management,that is,through related transactions and capital appropriation by major shareholders,resulting in a reduction in manipulable accrued profits,companies will use other means Perform earnings management.In addition,considering the impact of different property rights,it is found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have a stronger incentive to manage accrued earnings with the motive of covering up the tunneling of major shareholders.

关 键 词：大股东 掏空 盈余管理 操纵性应计利润 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]