克里普克的信念之谜  

The Puzzle about Belief and Epistemic Argument

作　　者：徐召清[1] Xu Zhaoqing

机构地区：[1]四川大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《哲学门》2017年第1期209-223,共15页Beida Journal of Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZX008,12AZD072);国家社科基金青年项目(17C2X051);教育部人文社科青年项目(15YJC72040001);四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(skzx2015-sb05,skqy201645)。

摘　　要：克里普克一方面将信念之谜看成是真正的谜题,另一方面也利用信念之谜来回应描述论者对直接指称论的一个批评:同一替换原则在认知语境中失效。在他看来,造成信念之谜的不是直接指称论的同一替换原则,而是关于信念归属句的更一般原则。采用克里普克的类似策略来考察反描述论的认知论证,则可以发现:如果可以通过信念之谜为直接指称论辩护,那么也可以用类似的描述之谜来回应克里普克反描述论的认知论证。对比发现,这两种辩护策略之所以都不成功,是因为其中都涉及对语言或概念的混淆,并且这种混淆是独立于名称理论之争的日常认知现象。Although Kripke regards the puzzle about belief as a real puzzle,the background of his puzzle is the debate between descriptivism and direct reference theory in philosophy of language.Kripke uses the puzzle about belief to defend direct reference theory against descriptivisfs epistemic argument.He contends that,the puzzle about belief follows not from direct reference theory,but some more general principles concerning attributions of belief.The same strategy can be applied to Kripke's epistemic argument against descriptivism,which results a similar puzzle of belief with descriptions and shows that:if one can use the puzzle of belief to defend direct reference theory,one can also use the puzzle of description to defend descriptivism.However,such a defense strategy cannot succeed,because in both cases,the subjects have some linguistic or conceptual confusion.Such confusion is ordinary cognitive phenomenon and independent of any theoretical debates about names.

关 键 词：信念之谜 同一替换原则 直接指称论 描述论 认知论证 语言或概念混淆 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]