员工持股计划与大股东股票减持——基于A股上市公司的实证研究  

Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Major Shareholder’s Stock Reduction:An Empirical Study Based on A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：王霞 袁天荣[1] WANG Xia;YUAN Tianrong(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《山东财经大学学报》2021年第4期89-98,共10页Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“上市公司分红的外部监管与内部治理耦合研究”(13BJY014);中南财经政法大学研究生教育创新计划资助项目“员工持股计划与股价崩盘风险”(20203112)。

摘　　要：利用2014—2018年沪深A股上市公司数据,通过构建Probit模型实证研究了大股东股票减持与员工持股计划实施之间的关系。在解决互为因果的内生性问题基础上,研究发现,在宣告实施员工持股计划后,大股东进行了股票减持并实现了高位套现,员工持股计划背后可能潜藏着大股东股票减持的自利动机。在信息透明度较高和机构投资者持股比例较高的公司中,该减持行为受到了显著抑制。进一步研究发现,大股东股票减持的自利动机在短期内并不易被市场准确识别。研究结论能够为员工持股计划的制度设计与完善提供经验证据,为大股东减持监管提供参考。By using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 and constructing the Probit model, this paper empirically studies the relationship between employee stock ownership plan(ESOP) and major shareholder’s stock reduction. It is found on the basis of solving the endogenous problems of mutual causation that after the implementation of ESOP is announced, the major shareholders reduce their stock holding and realize high-level cash-out, and behind the ESOP, there may be major shareholders’ self-interest motive to reduce their shares. In the companies with higher information transparency and higher proportion of share holding by institutional investors, such a reduction behavior is significantly inhibited. The further research shows that the self-interest motive of major shareholders’ stock reduction is not easy to be accurately identified by the market in the short term. The research conclusion can provide empirical evidence for the system design and improvement of ESOP, and provide a reference for supervising major shareholders’ reduction.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 股票减持 大股东自利 市值管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]