再论亚里士多德的幸福  

Again on Aristotle’s Happiness

作　　者：吕纯山[1] Lu Chunshan

机构地区：[1]天津外国语大学欧美文化哲学研究所

出　　处：《哲学门》2018年第1期69-86,共18页Beida Journal of Philosophy

基　　金：2014年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目的阶段性成果(项目批准号:14YJC720022)。

摘　　要：本文针对研究者们认为亚里士多德《尼各马可伦理学》中的幸福观有论证不严密的嫌疑,并力图调和综合论幸福和理智论幸福的做法,指出《尼各马可伦理学》的幸福观点并没有含混之处,而是观点鲜明、论证思路清晰的,既与他在这部书中的主旨一致,也符合他的一贯做法,因此那些认为这部书内容矛盾的说法都是对他论证思路的误解。在亚里士多德那里,理智论亦即沉思的幸福是第一等的幸福,综合论的幸福是第二等的幸福,亚里士多德在这部书中刻意区分了这两种幸福,因此任何试图调和这两种幸福的做法也是对他的旨趣的误解,本文也具体分析了一些不成功的做法。Some researchers of Aristotle’s philosophy believe that Aristotle’s argument on the view of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics is not strict,so they try to reconcile the practice of comprehensive happiness with intellectualism.This paper points out that Aristotle’s view of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics is not ambiguous,and it has been given a clear point of view and a tight reasoning.It is consistent with Aristotle’s subject in this book and his general theory in other books.Therefore,those who believe that the argument in this book is contradictory are wrong.To him,the intellectualist happiness,namely the contemplating one,is the first happiness,while the comprehensive happiness is the second.Aristotle deliberately distinguishes these two kinds of happiness in this book.So any attempt to reconcile these two kinds of happiness is also a misunderstanding of his purported interest.This paper also analyzes some unsuccessful reconciling practices.

关 键 词：幸福 综合论 沉思 外在善 直观理性 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]