基于双层委托代理视角的非公共海绵设施运维激励机制  

Incentive mechanism of operation and maintenance of non-public infrastructures in sponge cities based on double-principalagent

作　　者：丁雷杰 丁继勇[1,2] 翟武娟 DING Leijie;DING Jiyong;ZHAI Wujuan(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;Engineering Management Institute,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]河海大学工程管理研究所,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《水利经济》2021年第4期46-53,79,共9页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(41877526);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2019B23314)。

摘　　要：在总结海绵城市非公共基础设施运维模式的基础上,分析了海绵设施运维阶段主要利益相关方之间形成的链式双层委托代理关系。引入公平偏好理论和周边绩效理论,对传统H-M模型进行改进,构建了非公共海绵设施运维激励模型并进行求解。结果表明:激励合同的激励水平与业主的周边行为对各利益相关方的效用是动态影响因素;在公平视角下,最佳激励系数的大小取决于政府方和业主的博弈结果。从政府方角度设计了一套包括激励方式和激励水平的激励机制,并进行算例仿真。On the basis of summarizing the operation and maintenance mode of non-public infrastructures in sponge cities,the chain double-principal agent relationship between the main stakeholders during the operation stage of the sponge infrastructures is analyzed. By introducing the theories of fairness preference and contextual performance, the traditional H-M model is improved,and the incentive model for the operation and maintenance of non-public sponge infrastructures is established and solved. The results show that:( 1) The incentive level of the contract and the dependency coefficient of the owner are the dynamic influencing factors for the stakeholders.( 2) From the perspective of fairness,the optimal incentive coefficient β*is determined by the game between the government and the owner.Accordingly,a set of incentive mechanism is designed from the perspective of the government,including incentive mode and incentive level,and a simulation example is given.

关 键 词：海绵城市 运维管理 激励机制 非公共设施 双层委托代理 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]