供应商歧视定价下网络零售商店内推介策略研究  

Study of In-store Referral Strategies of E-retailers with Suppler Discriminatory Pricing

作　　者：罗明 李增禄 LUO Ming;LI Zeng-lu(School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;School of Business, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]河南大学商学院,河南开封475004

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第8期175-180,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：成都市哲学社会科学院项目:碳交易下企业低碳供应链运营管理研究(2019L17)。

摘　　要：研究了供应商歧视定价时网络零售商店内推介策略。首先,以供应商统一定价模型为基准,通过逆推归纳法求解不同推介策略组合下零售商和供应商的均衡利润,研究发现:仅当消费者对两家零售商认知差异较小时四种推介策略组合才能同时成立,且随着推介费用的增大两零售商均衡推介策略依次为:都不推介、仅强势零售商1推介和双向推介。其次,构建供应商歧视定价模型,发现歧视定价有利于弱势零售商2获得市场空间,随着消费者对两家零售商感知差异和推介费用的变化呈现出多样化的均衡推介策略。最后,探讨了两种定价模型下供应商的最优利润,发现受推介策略的影响歧视定价未必能够为供应商带来更多利润。The supplier’s wholesale price strategies always have a profound impact on the downstream decision.In this paper,we study the downstream retailers’referral strategies considering two wholesale pricing models,i.e.uniform pricing model and discrimination pricing model.Firstly,we establish the uniform pricing model,and then solve this decision model by backward induction.The results show that:when the consumer cognition is similar,with the increase in referral fee,the equilibrium referral strategies are not retailer referral,but only the strong retailer(retailer 1)referral and mutual referral in proper sequence.Secondly,we derive the optimal solutions in discrimination pricing model,and find that discrimination wholesale price strategy can improve the competitiveness of the weak retailer(retailer 2).With the change in consumer cognition and referral fee,diversified equilibrium is presented.Finally,we find that the supplier’s profit in discriminatory pricing model is not always better than that in uniform pricing model due to the influence of retailers’referral strategies.

关 键 词：歧视定价 统一定价 推介策略 消费者认知 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]