奥古斯丁预定论的哲学辩护:以雅各伯的拣选为例  

Augustine on the Election of Jacob:A Philosophical Defense of Divine Predestination

作　　者：吴天岳[1] Wu Tianyue

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学门》2013年第2期1-31,共31页Beida Journal of Philosophy

摘　　要：提当代学界少有人从哲学立场直面上帝的行动对人的自由所造成的威胁。本文将接受这一挑战,通过重建奥古斯丁的相关洞见,在当代哲学语境中正面阐释神圣预定如何能与我们的道德直觉相容。本研究以《罗马书》中所提及的雅各伯(雅各)的拣选为例,扼要展示奥古斯丁晚期预定论的基本立场,并在此基础上虚构一个“法兰克福式案例”(Frankfurt-style case)为之进行初步辩护。我们还将考查当代不相容论者基于“操纵论证”(Manipulation Argument)对法兰克福式案例提出的尖锐批评,在此图景中揭示奥古斯丁预定论中的一个重要洞见,即道德责任的非对称性结构。它将为我们回应“操纵论证”,使当下有关自由意愿的论战摆脱立场之争提供指引。By reconstructing Augustine’s insights into the relationship between divine action and human freedom this essay aims to explain how divine predestination can be philosophically compatible with our moral intui-tions today.It will focus on the election of Jacob to show Augustine’s posi-tion in his later works and offer a preliminary defense by appealing to a Frankfurt-style case.Then it will examine the sharp criticisms of Frankfurt-style cases from contemporary incompatabilists by Manipulation Argument.This critical examination will reveal a significant find in Augustine’s doctrine of predestination i.e.the asymmetric structure of moral responsibility which will help us respond to the criticisms from Manipulation Argument and liberate the debate on free will from the dialectical stalemate.

关 键 词：预定论 自由意愿 操纵论证 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]