环境规制、地方政府与资源型企业绿色责任行为--基于福柯权力思想和政企互动双视角的博弈分析  

Environmental Regulation,Local Government and Green Responsibility Behavior of Resource-Based Enterprises----Game Analysis Based on Foucault's Power Thought and Government Enterprise Interaction

作　　者：赵敏 赵国浩[1] ZHAO Min;ZHAO Guo-hao(School of Management Science and Engineering,Shanxi University of Finance&Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学工商管理学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《统计学报》2021年第4期12-27,共16页Journal of Statistics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71774105);山西省软科学研究计划项目(2019041012-1);山西省高等学校人文社科研究基地项目(HH202003)。

摘　　要：基于博弈论分析方法,以福柯权力思想为入手点,结合政企互动模式,研究环境规制下地方政府和资源型企业绿色责任行为间的博弈关系,探讨不同博弈情形下的均衡情况,并分析两种行为交互系统中各均衡点的局部稳定性。研究表明:凝视者通过权力作用会对被凝视者产生影响,而被凝视者可以通过抵抗行为的调节来获取相应的权益;政府作为制度供给方实施环境规制,企业通过主动实施绿色责任行为,获取身份认定。Based on the analysis methods of game theory,the paper started from Foucault's power thought,and applied government-enterprise interaction mode to explore the game relationship between local government and the green responsibility behavior of resource-based enterprises under environmental regulation.Then the paper discussed the equilibrium conditions in different game situations,and analyzed the local stability of each equilibrium point in two kinds of behavioral interaction systems.The study proved that,gazers may exert power effect on their objects,and those being gazed could obtain corresponding rights through the adjustment of resistance behavior.That is,the governments,as the supplier of the system,implemented environmental regulation,while enterprises would get the identity through taking the initiative to implement green responsibility behavior.

关 键 词：企业绿色责任行为 环境规制 演化博弈 权力思想 政企互动 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]