信念伦理学何以可能  

How Is the Ethics of Belief Possible

作　　者：王庆原 WANG Qingyuan

机构地区：[1]海南师范大学马克思主义学院,571158 [2]厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心,361005

出　　处：《国外社会科学前沿》2021年第9期24-38,共15页JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“当代知识论的系列研究”(14ZDB012)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：信念伦理学的基本主张是:我们对自己相信什么,即对自己的信念负有某种道德责任。信念伦理学的反对者通过信念的非意志论论证说,由于人们并不能控制自己的信念行为,因此我们无须为自己的信念负责;信念伦理学是不可能的。面对非意志论者的挑战,信念伦理学的拥护者主要提出下列解决方案:1.信念意志论:包括(1)直接信念意志论,它主张人们至少对他们的某些信念具有直接的意志控制;(2)间接信念意志论,它主张人们至少对他们的某些信念具有间接的意志控制。2.信念相容论,其主张是:信念的责任和信念的非意志论是相容的;即便我们不能够对自己的信念实施意志控制,我们也必须对自己的信念负责。信念意志论者和信念相容论者经由各种具体论证证明其观点的正确性,进而证明我们要对自己的信念负责;即,信念伦理学是可能的。The basic idea of the ethics of belief is that we are responsible for our own believing, we have a moral duty to our own beliefs. While through the Anti-voluntarism Argument, the opponents of the ethics of belief argue that one cannot be requested to do this, for there is no way a person could control his belief actions. That is to say, the ethics of belief is impossible. To meet the challenges of the involuntarist, the proponents of the ethics of belief propose the following solutions:(1)The Doxastic Voluntarism, including(a)the Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and(b) the Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism. The Direct Doxastic Voluntarism holds that at least we can exercise direct doxastic control on some of our beliefs, and the Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism holds that at least we can exercise indirect doxastic control on some of our beliefs.(2)The Doxastic Compatibilism, this viewpoint holds that the duty of belief is compatible with the doxastic involuntarism;or we are responsible for our beliefs even if we cannot exercise doxastic control on our beliefs. The doxastic voluntarist and the doxastic compatibilist prove their point of view by various kinds of specific arguments, and thus prove that we should be responsible for our beliefs. In a word, the ethics of belief is possible.

关 键 词：信念伦理学 信念意志论 直接信念意志论 间接信念意志论 信念相容论 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]