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作 者:林琪 赵秋红[1,2] 颜迎晨 Lin Qi;Zhao Qiuhong;Yan Yingchen(School of Economics and Management,Beihang University,Beijing 100191;Beijing Key Laboratory of Emergency Support Simulation Technologies for City Operations,Beijing 100191)
机构地区:[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191 [2]城市运行保障模拟技术北京市重点实验室,北京100191
出 处:《管理评论》2021年第8期302-313,共12页Management Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目(72021001)。
摘 要:新冠病毒肺炎疫情的爆发凸显了生产能力储备在应对重大突发公共卫生事件中的重要性。本文从采购商的角度出发,考虑应急医疗防控物资的生产特点,探讨当制造商拥有私人的生产能力信息时,如何通过合同设计引导制造商诚实地披露生产能力并按采购商的期望行动。首先,基于批发价合同模型探讨了不考虑信息不对称时的最优采购合同设计;然后,基于信号甄别模型探讨了考虑信息不对称时的最优采购合同设计;在此基础上,基于两部分关税合同模型优化了菜单合同以适应制造商生产投入不可立约的情形;最后,通过算例对比分析了所构建的模型并说明了模型的有效性。本文能为重大突发公共卫生事件的生产能力储备定价与应急响应优化提供决策依据和管理建议。COVID-19 outbreak has highlighted the importance of production capacity reserve in response to major public health emergencies. Considering characteristics of the production of emergency medical supplies,this paper studies how to guide a manufacturer to truly report its productivity which is its private information and to act as a buyer expects through contract design. First,without considering information asymmetry,the wholesale price contract is designed. Then,taking information asymmetry into account,the menu contract is designed based on the screening model. Further,the two-part tariff contract is proposed to adapt to the situation where the manufacturer’s production input is non-contractible. Finally,the contracts are compared and analyzed numerically. This paper provides a decision-making basis and management insights for pricing production capacity reserve and optimizing emergency response for major public health emergencies.
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