晋升激励对地方国企发债成本的影响  

Impact of Promotion Incentive on Bond Issuing Cost of Local State-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：贾君怡 黄家明 JIA Junyi;HUANG Jiaming(School of International Economics and Management,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China;School of Banking and Finance,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学国际经管学院,北京100048 [2]对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京100029

出　　处：《中国软科学》2021年第8期110-119,共10页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(19CJY058)。

摘　　要：利用2002—2018年185个地级市的官员数据匹配853家地方国有企业发债数据,实证分析地方官员在晋升激励下如何影响辖区内地方国有企业发债行为。研究发现,市委书记晋升激励会显著加大辖区内国有企业的举债动机,表现为意愿承担的发债成本更高,且晋升激励越强,对发债成本的影响更显著。进一步研究表明,地方市场化程度越低、政府股东持股比例越大、国企高管“限薪令”实施,市委书记晋升激励对地方国企发债成本的提升效应更加显著。研究成果丰富了对政府治理与债务结构失衡治理的理解。Using the data of local officials in 185 cities,we empirically explore the impact of promotion incentive on bond issuing costs of 853 local state-owned enterprises(SOE)during the period of 2002 to 2018.The main findings are as follows:promotion incentive can strengthen the debt issuing motives of local SOEs,and thus significantly increase the bond issuing costs;and such effect will be enhanced if the promotion incentive increases.Moreover,with a lower local marketization,a higher government shareholding and the implement of Cap on SOEs Salary,the impact of promotion incentive on bond issuing costs becomes more significant.Our study enriches the literature of political intervention,offering great help to further understanding of structural deleveraging reform.

关 键 词：晋升激励 地方国企债务 发债成本 结构性去杠杆 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]