非实际控制人董事会权力与国企战略变革  

The Board Power of Non-actual Controller and the Strategic Change of State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：李春玲[1] 袁润森 李念[1] LI Chunling;YUAN Runsen;LI Nian(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinghuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2021年第8期116-140,共25页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：河北省软科学研究专项项目(205576103D);河北省教育厅人文社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(ZD201904)。

摘　　要：在混合所有制改革背景下,非实际控制人获取董事会席位后倾向于"因循守旧"还是"思变求新"尚未可知。为探究这一待检验的重要命题,基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论,选取2007—2017年的沪深A股国有上市公司为考察对象,深入研究了非实际控制人董事会权力对国企战略变革的影响及其具体的作用路径。研究结果表明:当非实际控制人获得董事会权力后,确实能够显著提升国企的战略变革程度;并且,非实际控制人董事会权力的治理效果通过其制衡效应而非协同效应发挥作用,说明制衡效应是非实际控制人影响战略行为的主要路径;进一步分析表明,仅当非实际控制人的性质为民营或国企受地方政府控制时,非实际控制人董事会权力对国企战略变革有明显的推动作用;另外,混合所有制改革政策推出后,在战略性行业的国企中非实际控制人董事会权力与战略变革显著正相关,产生了明显的政策效应。With the rapid economic growth into the new normal of high-quality development, Chinese enterprises are facing more opportunities and challenges. As a micro part of economic transformation, strategic change is essential for enterprises to adapt to the external environment changes and maintain or gain competitive advantages. At present, bureaucratic control and sunk investment of proprietary assets in state-owned enterprises(SOEs) make the threat-rigidity theory become the dominant of strategy change decision, and the strategic adjustment is difficult to keep pace with the change of external environment. The board undertakes the mission of allocating corporate strategic resources, which is of great significance to the strategic change. Under the context of the new round of deepening the reform of SOEs, the mixed-ownership reform introduces non-actual controllers and their appointed directors, which causes the change in the internal power structure of the board, and provides an ideal experimental scenario for optimizing the SOEs’ strategic behavior. In that way, will the board power of the non-actual controller exert an influence on the strategic change of SOEs? What is the specific governance logic? What are the distinctions of governance effects in different situations? Does the proposal of mixed-ownership reform have significant policy effects?Based on the principal-agent theory and resource dependence theory, a research framework of "non-actual controllerpower of delegated director-resource synergy/power balance-strategic change" is constructed to test the above propositions. From the dual perspectives of synergy and balance, drawing upon the panel data of state-owned listed enterprises from 2007 to 2017, the study investigates the influence of the board power of non-actual controller on the strategic change of SOEs and its specific mechanism. For the data acquisition of the board power of non-actual controller, the specific information of shareholders and their appointed directors is manually sorted by inqui

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 非实际控制人 董事会权力 战略变革 国有企业 

分 类 号：G275[文化科学—档案学] F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]