股权激励、经理人异质性与控制权私利  

Equity Incentives,Manager Heterogeneity and Private Benefits of Control

作　　者：李秉祥[1] 张涛涛 孙悦 LI Bing-xiang;ZHANG Tao-tao;SUN Yue(School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710054, China)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第9期210-215,224,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772151)。

摘　　要：文章探讨了不同类型的经理人对股权激励与控制权私利之间关系所起的作用,并以2008~2018年所有A股上市公司数据进行验证,结果发现:独立型经理人对股权激励抑制控制权私利的行为起着正向调节作用,依附型经理人并未发挥有效的监督效应;在内部控制质量较低的环境中,股权激励对控制权私利的抑制效应更显著,发挥的替代效果更佳。本文的研究深化了对经理人公司治理角色的认识,拓宽了对控制权私利的研究。This paper discusses the role of different types of managers in the relationship between equity incentives and PBC.A-share listed companies in 2008~2018 are selected for empirical verification.The results show that independent managers have a positive adjustment effect on equity incentives to suppress PBC,and dependent managers have not played an effective supervisory effect;in an environment with low internal control quality,equity incentive has more significant inhibiting effect on PBC and better substitution effect.This study deepens the understanding of the role of managers in corporate governance and broadens the research on PBC.

关 键 词：经理人异质性 股权激励 内部控制 控制权私利 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]