退社权假说、多重博弈和激励机制——集体化时期农民劳动积极性问题再考察  

Retirement Rights Hypothesis,Multipe Game and Incentives Mechanism:Re-Examination of the Farmers Enthusiasm for Labor in the Collectivization Period

作　　者：齐秀琳 王鑫 QI Xiu-lin;WANG Xin(Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou Henan 450000,China;School of Economics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Sichuan Chengdu 610000,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450000 [2]西南财经大学经济学院,四川成都610000

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2021年第10期32-39,共8页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年项目“C2F认购式订单农业的交易机制、合约结构与优化路径研究”(19YJC790101);河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目“河南省村庄社会异质性对小型农田水利管护绩效的影响研究”(2019-ZDJH-299)。

摘　　要：如何认识集体化时期农民的劳动积极性不仅是经济史上的重要问题,而且直接影响当前农村改革的路径选择。首先,本文通过回顾退社权假说及相关争论,对以退社权假说为代表的主流解释提出逻辑质疑,并指出过去的讨论皆建立在报复策略为冷酷策略,且该策略在他人不合作时一定会被触发这一过强的假设上。若放弃该假设,则农民选择积极劳作或偷懒的博弈均衡在理论上都能实现。其次,本文纳入具体历史情境分析,认为彼时农民与单干时相较劳动积极性固有不足,但在诸多条件约束下也决不会以磨洋工度日。最后,本文讨论了以往学界在理解相关实证工作时的一个重大误区:由公社制到承包制的制度变迁对农业产量的回归系数不仅不能理解为农民劳动积极性提高的结果,甚至不能简单识别为去集体化所带来的制度红利。How to recognize the labor enthusiasm of farmers in the collectivization period is not only an important issue in economic history,but also directly affects the path choice of the current rural reform.The mainstream interpretation of returning rights hypothesis is logically untenable.This paper firstly reviews the returning rights hypothesis and related arguments,pointing out that the past discussions are based on the grim strategy of retaliation strategy,and this strategy will be triggered when others do not cooperate.If this assumption is abandoned,the equilibrium of the game in which farmers choose to work actively or be lazy can be achieved theoretically.Then the paper analyzes the specific historical situation,and believes that the peasants and the single-handed are inherently less motivated than the labor enthusiasm,but under the constraints of many conditions,they will never loaf on the job.Finally,this paper discusses a major misunderstanding in the past when the academic community understands the relevant empirical work:the regression coefficient of the institutional change from the commune system to the contracting system on agricultural output cannot be interpreted as the result of the labor enthusiasm of the peasants,or even simply identified as the institutional dividend brought about by collectivization.

关 键 词：退社权假说 多重博弈 激励机制 信息不对称 劳动积极性 

分 类 号：F091.3[经济管理—政治经济学]