压力还是监督:机构投资者实地调研与盈余管理  

Pressure or Monitor:Institutional Investors’ Cooperate Site Visits and Surplus Management

作　　者：尹洪英[1] 徐星美[2] 权小锋[1] 张蓉 YIN Hong-ying;XU Xing-mei;QUAN Xiao-feng;ZHANG Rong(Dongwu Business School,Soochow University,Suzhou,Jiangsu 215021,China;International College,Renmin University of China,Suzhou Jiangsu,215123,China;Jiangsu Construction Engineering Group International Engineering Co.LTD,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210000,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215021 [2]中国人民大学国际学院,江苏苏州215123 [3]江苏省建筑工程集团国际工程有限公司,江苏南京210019

出　　处：《苏州大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第5期102-114,共13页Journal of Soochow University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“国有企业监督制度改革与创新研究”(项目编号:17ZDA087)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：机构投资者既是资本市场的重要参与者,也是健全公司治理结构的重要外部力量。基于"压力"与"监督"两个竞争性假说,研究考察机构投资者实地调研及其细分特征对上市公司盈余管理活动的真实影响。研究表明:机构投资者实地调研对盈余管理存在显著的抑制作用,这为"监督"假说提供了支持证据。从细分特征看,前十大股东机构参与、上市公司非高层接待以及长期问题导向的调研对盈余管理的治理效应更加显著。研究尝试探索被忽略的机构调研内容的"黑箱"如何影响上市公司的真实经济行为,一方面补充了上市公司盈余管理的综合决定因素框架,另一方面为监管部门优化上市公司投资者关系管理提供了实证证据。Based on the competitive hypotheses of"pressure"and"monitor",this paper investigates the real impact of institutional investors’field research on surplus management activities of listed companies.The results show that institutional investors’corporate site visits have a significant adverse effect on earnings management,which provides evidence for the"monitor"hypothesis.According to the characteristics of the corporate site visits,compared with the non-top 10 shareholders,visits from top 10 shareholders have more significant governance effect on earnings management;compared with the visit with Chairman or CEO,the non-upper echelons visits have more significant governance effect;compared with the short-term oriented visit,the long-term oriented visits have more significant governance effect.This study attempts to open up the"black box"of institutional investors’corporate site visits and analyzes how corporate site visits affect the real behavior of listed companies in depth.The findings help to supplement the framework of comprehensive determinants of surplus management of listed companies,and provide empirical evidence for regulators to improve the investor relationship management system as well.

关 键 词：机构投资者调研 盈余管理 压力假说 监督假说 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]