常识概念、神经科学与取消主义--《神经伦理学和关于常识的科学修正》述评  

Common Sense Concepts,Neuroscience and Eliminativism:A Review for Neuroethics and the Scientific Revision of Common Sense

作　　者：王帅 WANG Shuai(School of Humanities,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518061,China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学人文学院,广东深圳518061

出　　处：《医学与哲学》2021年第18期77-80,F0003,共5页Medicine and Philosophy

基　　金：2020年深圳市哲学社会科学规划课题(SZ2020C002)。

摘　　要：关于神经科学的进步带来的伦理涵义的探讨通常包括评估这种进步对常识概念框架的影响,尤其是对常识心理学和常识道德的影响。根据心灵哲学中的取消主义立场,在常识的概念框架和科学的概念框架之间存在着难以弥合的不兼容性。娜达通过引入刘易斯的功能主义方法论对这种所谓的不兼容立场给予反驳。通过进一步引入神经科学和神经伦理学等交叉学科研究,娜达得出结论:常识心理学和常识道德的概念框架已经吸收并将会不断吸收前沿科学理论的影响,常识与神经科学在概念框架上是相连续的而非不兼容的关系。Debates about the ethical implications of advancements in neuroscience often include estimates of how such developments will affect common sense frameworks,especially on the conceptual frameworks of psychology and that of morality.According to eliminativism in philosophy of mind,there exists irreconcilable incompatibility between common sense and scientific conceptual frameworks.By resorting to Lewis's approach to functionalism,Nada rejects the claim of the purported incompatibility.By further analyzing a set of interdisciplinary studies in neuroscience as well as in neuroethics,she arrives at a philosophical scenario in which the incompatibility between the frameworks in common sense and neuroscience is dismissed in a way that common sense frameworks have absorbed and will continue to absorb the influences of neuroscience,and as a result,common sense is continuous rather than incompatible with neuroscience in terms of the conceptual frameworks.

关 键 词：常识心理学 常识道德 神经科学 取消主义 人格同一性 

分 类 号：R-05[医药卫生]