基于博弈论的无信号交叉口冲突消解方法  

Conflict Resolution Method Based on Game Theory at Unsignalized Intersection

作　　者：马庆禄[1] 聂振宇 MA Qinglu;NIE Zhenyu(School of Traffic&Transportation,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学交通运输学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（自然科学）》2021年第10期144-151,共8页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金国家应急管理体系建设研究专项项目(20VYJ023);重庆市教育委员会教委科学技术研究计划重点项目(KJZD-K202000704);重庆市技术预见与制度创新专项项目(cstc2019jsyj-yzysbA0058);教育部人文社科一般项目(20YJAZH132)。

摘　　要：为解决无信号交叉口通行权冲突问题,以降低交叉口冲突率为目标,提出一种基于驾驶行为博弈的研究方法,以驾驶人车辆速度改变为策略,通过冲突点时间和避险行为影响计算驾驶人收益,软件模拟不同视距条件和车辆初始速度下的驾驶行为并计算收益,分析每次博弈的纳什均衡状态和冲突率变化,由纳什均衡状态逆向找出最优停车视距。研究结果表明:将实验路段停车视距由30 m调整为40 m后,无信号交叉口冲突率由原来的4.59%降低为优化后的2.35%,说明了该研究方法在无信号交叉口通行权冲突消解以及交通规划设计中应用的合理性。In order to solve the problem of right-of-way conflicts at unsignalized intersections,with the goal of reducing intersection conflicts,a research method based on driving behavior games is proposed.Taking the change of driver’s vehicle speed as a strategy,the driver’s income is calculated by the influence of conflict point time and risk avoidance behavior.The software simulates the driving behavior under different sight distance conditions and the initial vehicle speed and calculates the income.The Nash equilibrium state and conflict rate change of each game are analyzed,and the optimal parking sight distance is found reversely from the Nash equilibrium state.The results show that the impact of different stopping sight distances on driver strategy and intersection conflict rate.After adjusting the stopping sight distance of the experimental section from 30 meters to 40 meters,the conflict rate of the unsignalized intersection is reduced from 4.59%to 2.35%after optimization.It shows the rationality of the application of this research method in the conflict resolution of traffic rights and traffic planning and design of unsignalized intersection.

关 键 词：交通工程 无信号交叉口 停车视距 博弈论 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]