基于演化博弈的新型上下级行为期望研究  

A Study on New Behavior Expectation of Superior and Subordinate Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：冯玉玺[1] 赵卉紫 纪博心 FENG Yu-xi;ZHAO Hui-zi;JI Bo-xin(Colloge of Finance and Economics,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Taian 271000,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学财经学院,泰安271000

出　　处：《价值工程》2021年第31期54-59,共6页Value Engineering

摘　　要：为了探究如何建立共赢的新型上下级行为,文章将演化博弈应用于二者之间复杂行为的交互作用研究中,构建双方的动态演化博弈模型;计算博弈双方在不同行为选择下的收益,并进行了稳定性分析;然后运用MATLAB对双方的行为演化路径进行了仿真模拟。结果表明:该系统的演化方向与系统的初始条件有关;不同的初始条件下,能得到四个演化稳定点;最后,对三种含有不服从行为策略的组合提出了对策建议。In order to explore how to establish a win-win new superior and subordinate behavior,this paper applies evolutionary game to the interaction between the two complex behaviors,and constructs the dynamic evolutionary game model of both sides.The payoff of each side under different behavior choices is calculated and the stability is analyzed.Then the behavior evolution path of both sides is simulated by MATLAB.The results show that the evolution direction of the system is related to the initial conditions of the system.Under different initial conditions,four evolutionary stability points can be obtained.Finally,suggestions are put forward for three combinations of disobedience behavior strategies.

关 键 词：行为期望 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]