考虑零售商公平关切的绿色供应链主体行为演化博弈研究  

A Research on Evolutionary Game Behavior of Different Stakeholders in Green Supply Chain with the Fairness Concern of the Retailer

作　　者：邵必林[1] 崔梦桦 SHAO Bilin;CUI Menghua(School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《工业工程》2021年第5期124-131,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：住房和城乡建设部软科学研究资助项目(2019-R-022)。

摘　　要：基于演化博弈的相关理论,在绿色供应链运营过程中考虑零售商公平关切行为,构建供应商、零售商与政府的演化博弈模型并进行稳定性分析,结合数值仿真动态研究政府干预成本、补贴与惩罚力度、供应商绿色成本、零售商公平关切系数的变化对供应链成员策略行为演化结果的影响,以期为实现三方利益平衡提供参考。结果表明,供应商绿色成本与零售商公平关切系数对绿色供应链构建的影响呈正相关;政府监管成本对绿色供应链构建的影响呈负相关;政府补贴与惩罚力度对绿色供应链构建的影响具有阶段差异性。Based on the relevant theory of evolutionary game, considering the fairness concern behavior of retailers in the process of green supply chain operation, an evolutionary game model of suppliers, retailers and the government is constructed and a stability analysis is conducted, and combining with numerical simulation, the effects of changes in government intervention costs, subsidies and penalties, supplier green costs, and retailer fairness of concern coefficients on the evolution of the strategic behavior of supply chain members are dynamically studied. It is expected to provide a reference for achieving a balance of interests among the three parties. The results show that the supplier’s green cost and the retailer’s fairness concern coefficient are positively related to the impact on the green supply chain. The government’s regulatory cost is negatively related to the impact on the green supply chain. The effects of government subsidies are different from the penalties in different stages on the green supply chain.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 多主体 公平关切 三方博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]