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作 者:丁小洲 付丹[1,2] 郭韬 DING Xiao-zhou;FU Dan;GUO Tao(School of Economics and Management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001,China;Heilongjiang Regional Innovation Driven Development Research Center,Harbin 150001,China)
机构地区:[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]哈尔滨工程大学黑龙江创新驱动发展研究中心,黑龙江哈尔滨150001
出 处:《系统工程》2021年第5期11-20,共10页Systems Engineering
基 金:国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AGL009)。
摘 要:基于演化博弈理论,从创新合作伙伴间技术差异的视角构建了科技型创业企业技术创新模式选择的演化博弈模型,分析其演化路径、稳定均衡策略及其参数影响的作用机理,并对各参数变量的演化结果进行实例仿真。结果表明:不同技术差异下,企业与高校或科研院所的合作收益、投入资金对科技型创业企业选择自主创新模式有促进作用;企业与高校或科研院所的投资成本、合作风险系数则对科技型创业企业选择合作创新模式有促进作用。此外,不同收益比例在不同范围内对企业进行技术创新模式选择的影响不同。By using evolutionary game theory, based on the perspective of technological differences between innovation partners, an evolutionary game model for the selection of innovation modes of science and technology star-ups is constructed. The mechanism of its evolutionary path, stable equilibrium strategy and its influence on parameters are analyzed. The numerical simulation of the evolution of each parameter variable is carried out. The results show that: under different technological differences, the cooperation income and investment funds of enterprises and universities or scientific research institutes can promote the choice of independent innovation models. The investment cost and cooperation risk coefficients of enterprises and universities or scientific research institutes play a promote role in choosing a cooperative innovation model. In addition, different income ratios have different impacts on the choice of technological innovation models in different ranges.
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