义务归属命题的得与失:对信任之为一种道德态度的探讨  

The Gains and Losses of the Obligation-Ascription Thesis:A Discussion on Trust as a Moral Attitude

作　　者：郝文君[1] HAO Wen-jun(College of Marxism,Guangzhou Medical University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,511436)

机构地区：[1]广州医科大学马克思主义学院,广东广州511436

出　　处：《韩山师范学院学报》2021年第5期74-79,共6页Journal of Hanshan Normal University

基　　金：2016年度广东省哲学社会科学“十三五”规划学科共建项目(项目编号:GD16XZX01);2017年度教育部青年基金项目(项目编号:17YJC710012);广东省教育科学“十三五”规划2020年度研究项目(项目编号:2020GXJK049)。

摘　　要：菲利普·尼克尔在论证信任是一种道德态度时,提出了义务归属命题,即如果E信任F去做X,就意味着E把做X的义务归属于F。这一命题面临“非道德信任可能性”与“动机无效”的批评。尼克尔对前者的回应确实突出了信任作为一种道德态度的特征,但对后者的回应并不成功,而这可以从当代道德哲学家对行为理由与动机关联的讨论中获得丰富的资源。最后,单从义务归属去解释信任要求过强,不仅会限制信任的范围,还会忽视信任的德性维度,不能反映信任这种道德态度的复杂性与多面性。In order to justify trust as a moral attitude,P.J.Nickel puts forward the obliga-tion-ascription thesis.That is,if E trusts F to do X,it means that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X.This thesis is faced with the criticism of the“possibility of amoral trust”and“motivational inef-ficacy”.Nickel’s response to the former does highlight the characteristics of trust as a moral attitude.However,his response to the latter is unsuccessful,which can benefit from contemporary moral philos-ophers’discussions on the correlation between the reason and the motive for the action.Finally,to explain trust too strongly according to the“obligation-ascription”alone would not only limit the scope of trust,but also ignore the virtue dimension of trust and fail to reflect the complexity and multifacet-ed nature of trust as a moral attitude.

关 键 词：信任 道德态度 义务归属 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]