检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:岳朝龙[1] 尚慧 YUE Chaolong;SHANG Hui(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan 243032,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243032
出 处:《安徽工业大学学报(自然科学版)》2021年第4期467-471,共5页Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Natural Science)
摘 要:运用博弈论的分析方法,引入质量成本模型,建立考虑声誉激励的基于质量的激励决策模型,将模型运用到工程案例中,利用MATLAB软件对模型进行求解,验证模型的有效性。结果表明:该模型能够实现业主与承包商的“双赢”,引导承包商自觉提高工程质量水平;业主对承包商实施显性质量收益激励,同时借助市场给承包商的隐性质量声誉激励会对工程质量起到事半功倍的效果。Using the analysis method of game theory,the quality cost model was introduced,and a quality-based incentive decision model was established,which considered the reputation incentives as important factors.The model was applied to an engineering case,and the MATLAB software was used to solve the model to verify the effectiveness of the model.The results show that this model can achieve a“win-win”between the owner and the contractor,and guide the contractor to consciously improve the quality of the project.When the owner implements explicit quality income incentives to the contractors,it can achieve a multiplier effect with the help of the implicit quality reputation incentives given to the contractors by the market.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.145