考虑双主并方失望规避的合作并购微分博弈策略  

Differential Game Strategy of M&A with Two Bidders'Cooperation Considering Disappointment Aversion

作　　者：于迪 宋力[1] YU Di;SONG Li(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang 110870)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,沈阳110870

出　　处：《软科学》2021年第11期99-105,共7页Soft Science

摘　　要：考虑并购中主并方具有失望规避特征,运用微分博弈研究双主并方并购投入和协调问题,探讨集中式决策、分散式决策和Stackelberg博弈下双方失望规避程度对并购努力水平和利润的影响,并对结果进行仿真分析,以验证相关参数有效性。结果表明:集中式决策优于Stackelberg博弈与分散式决策,是企业最优决策模式;单向成本分担的Stackelberg博弈可以改善分散式决策下的结果;主并方失望规避对并购努力水平、并购协同效应、各自利润及系统总利润等都存在抑制作用,即失望规避程度越高,并购积极性越低,并购绩效越低。Considering the disappointment aversion characteristics of two bidders’, this paper analyzes the investment and coordination of both parties by establishing a differential game. And then, it explores the influence of disappointment aversion on M&A efforts and profits under centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making and Stackelberg game. At the same time, it makes simulation analysis of the results to verify the validity of relevant parameters. Results show that centralized decision-making is better than Stackelberg game and decentralized decision-making, and it is the optimal decision-making mode for two bidders. The Stackelberg game of single cost sharing improves the results of decentralized decision-making. The level of M&A effort, M&A synergy, respective profits and system profits are all negatively related to the disappointment aversion, that is the higher the degree of disappointment aversion, the lower the M&A enthusiasm and performance.

关 键 词：合作并购 失望规避 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F271.4[经济管理—企业管理] F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]