知识产权质押融资模式的演化博弈研究  被引量:4

The Research on the Evolutionary Game of the Financing Model of Intellectual Property Pledge

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作  者:张超 施洁[2] ZHANG Chao;SHI Jie(School of Economics and Management,Harbin Institute of Technology(Shenzhen),Shenzhen Guangdong 518055,China;Research Institute of Economics,Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences,Shenzhen Guangdong 518028,China)

机构地区:[1]哈尔滨工业大学(深圳)经济管理学院,广东深圳518055 [2]深圳市社会科学院经济研究所,广东深圳518028

出  处:《技术经济与管理研究》2021年第11期57-61,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基  金:哈尔滨工业大学(深圳)人文社会科学发展专项基金项目(20210014);深圳市哲学社会科学规划课题(SZ2019B011);深圳市社会科学院2021年度专项科研一般课题项目。

摘  要:文章利用演化博弈理论,研究是否有政府支持背景下中小企业与银行两方博弈及中小企业、银行与担保机构三方博弈的融资行为演化过程及稳定性标准,分析不同市场主体在融资博弈中演化稳定策略。研究表明:在市场机制作用下,中小企业与银行两方博弈达到帕累托最优状态其不稳定性较高,担保机构的介入实现与银行贷款风险分担,促使该体系收敛于最优状态。在政府作用下,政府的贴息政策降低中小企业融资成本,增强了其与银行融资合作概率;设立风险补偿金对银行给予风险补偿,增强银行贷款积极性。相比纯市场融资模式,政府作用下直接质押与间接质押是知识产权质押融资的重要形式。This article uses evolutionary game theory to explore the evolution process of financing behavior and stability criteria of the two-party game between SMEs and banks and the tripartite game between SMEs,banks and guarantee institutions with government participation or not,and analyze the evolutionary stability criteria of different market entities in the financing game.The study concludes that under the effect of the market mechanism,the two-party game between SMEs and banks has reached a Pareto optimal state,which has high instability;The intervention of guarantee institutions can share the loan risks with the bank,which promotes the system to converge to pare support the best state.Under the role of the government,the discount interest policies can reduce the financing costs of SMEs and increase the probability of financing cooperation between SMEs and banks;The risk compensation funds can effectively reduce banks'loan risks and increase banks'lending enthusiasm.Compared with the pure market financing model,direct pledge and indirect pledge under the government's role are important forms of intellectual property pledge financing.

关 键 词:中小企业 直接质押 信用担保 演化博弈 质押融资 

分 类 号:F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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