集团公司董事会建设与央企全要素生产率——一项准自然实验  

Board Reform of Holding Group and Total Factor Productivity of Central State-owned Enterprise:A Quasi-natural Experiment

作　　者：于瑶 祁怀锦[1] YU Yao;QI Huai-jin(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing,100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《经济管理》2021年第10期24-41,共18页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：财政部会计名家培养工程项目(财政部文件财会[2017]26号);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“大股东股权质押的行为、动机与风险研究”(19YJA790068);中央财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目“控股股东治理结构改进与企业投资行为研究”(20192Y008)。

摘　　要：本研究以国务院国资委主导的央企控股集团公司董事会建设为准自然实验,以2005—2018年央企制造业上市公司为样本,分析了该项控股集团公司治理改革对下属子公司全要素生产率的影响及其作用路径。研究发现,集团母公司董事会建设提升了所控股制造业上市子公司的全要素生产率。董事会的成立对母公司现有监督治理手段与条件产生了补充作用,在高管纵向兼任较少以及母子公司地理距离更远的样本中,集团母公司董事会建设对上市子公司全要素生产率的促进作用更加明显。中介效应分析得出集团母公司董事会建设主要通过降低管理层代理成本、抑制大股东掏空、改善信息环境以及缓解政策性负担对全要素生产率产生了促进作用。在集团母公司存在超额控制权、上市子公司机构投资者持股比例较低以及非技术密集型行业的样本中,该促进作用更加显著。本研究从控股股东自身治理改革视角丰富了全要素生产率影响因素的理论研究,明确了顶层治理结构设计的重要意义,为提升央企资源配置效率、打造世界一流企业提供了路径参考。China’s state-owned enterprises have formed the control structure of"government-holding group company-listed company".In order to realize the complementary role of the market and the government,it is necessary to reduce the government’s intervention and control on the company’s operation level on the one hand,and establish a market-oriented governance model on the other hand.At the level of the central enterprise group,the system of one-person responsibility is implemented for a long period of time.Although it is conducive to the improvement of decision-making efficiency,it cannot give play to the advantages of collective decision-making and modern governance system.The contradiction between the administration of holding group companies and the market-oriented governance model of listed companies affects the high-quality development of central enterprises.In 2004,the Chinese government began to require SOE group companies to construct boards.This is the beginning of the government to further decentralize the decision-making power and establish a new right relationship between the government and enterprises in combination with modern corporate governance theory.Total factor productivity(TFP)is an important indicator to measure the level of high quality economic development.It is found that the board reform of holding group improves the TFP of the listed manufacturing subsidiaries.In addition,in the sample that are fewer shared senior managers and further distant between the parent company and subsidiaries,the board reform has a more obvious promoting effect on the TFP of listed subsidiaries.The mediating effect analysis shows that the board reform can promote TFP mainly by reducing the management agency cost,restraining the hollowing out of major shareholders,improving the information environment and reducing government intervention.The governance effect is more significant in the sample of group parent company with excess control,listed subsidiaries with low shareholding ratio of institutional investors,and

关 键 词：董事会改革 中央企业 控股股东治理 全要素生产率 母子公司 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]