股权激励合约业绩目标设置与公司投资  

The Performance Targets in Equity Incentive Contracts and Corporate Investment

作　　者：宋迪 杨超[2,3] SONG Di;YANG Chao

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学商学院 [2]清华大学经济管理学院 [3]华夏幸福产业投资有限公司

出　　处：《财务研究》2021年第5期66-77,共12页Finance Research

基　　金：中国政法大学青年教师资助计划项目(10821706)。

摘　　要：近年来﹐股权激励计划成为公司激励核心人才的重要手段。利用2006~2016年间A股上市公司股权激励计划实施数据,探讨了股权激励合约业绩目标设置对公司投资的影响。研究发现∶(1)当股权激励合约业绩目标设置较严格时,能够激励高管提高投资规模和投资效率。(2)相比于股票期权,限制性股票对高管的正向激励效果更强。(3)当高管受股权激励的强度较高时,股权激励合约中设置的业绩目标能够更加显著地提高未来公司投资规模以及投资效率。本文的研究结论支持了最优契约理论,为股权激励和公司投资等领域的研究提供了有价值的启示。In recent years,equity incentive plans have become an important means for companies to motivate core talents.Using data on the implementation of equity incentive plans of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2016,this paper explores the impact of the performance target in equity incentive contract on company investment.The research found that:When the performance target in equity incentive contract is set strictly,it can encourage the senior management to achieve the performance target by increasing the investment scale and investment efficiency.Compared with stock options,restricted stocks have a stronger positive incentive effect on executives.When the intensity of equity incentives for executives is high,the performance target set in the equity incentive contract can more significantly improve the company's investment scale and investment efficiency in the future.The conclusions of this paper support the optimal contract theory and provide valuable enlightenment for the research of equity incentives and corporate investment.

关 键 词：股权激励计划 业绩目标 公司投资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]