道德风险、虚拟企业和内部成员激励契约设计  

Moral Hazard,Virtual Enterprise and Incentive Contract Design of Internal Members

作　　者：关松立[1] 林淑伟 GUAN Songli;LIN Shuwei(School of Management,Putian University,Putian,Fujian 351100,China)

机构地区：[1]莆田学院管理学院,福建莆田351100

出　　处：《南京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第4期57-61,共5页Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics（Social Sciences）

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划基础研究年度项目(FJ2018MGCA041)。

摘　　要：从道德风险控制的角度出发,通过虚拟企业内部盟员企业合理的利益分配机制,分析完全信息条件下和道德风险中性情况下的最优契约,并进行激励契约的设计。研究发现,在不考虑道德风险和完全信息条件下,盟主企业激励盟员企业正向努力需要付出一定的成本,努力水平的增加会在很大程度上提高生产水平;在道德风险中性情况下,尽管盟员企业的努力程度不一定能被盟主企业或监督机构监测到,但道德风险并不会阻碍虚拟企业的发展,最优的区间激励方式是可以被使用的;激励契约的设计过程是以对买卖双方的信息收集为基础的,信息的收集有助于判断买方的风险偏好,并进而确定虚拟企业内部的分工以及如何进行契约激励。研究结果表明,在激励契约的设计过程中,契约模型的选择以及契约成本和收益的权衡是设计的核心和关键。From the point of view of moral hazard control,the paper analyzes the optimal contract under the condition of complete information and moral hazard neutral,and then designs the incentive contract through the reasonable benefit distribution mechanism of virtual enterprise.It is found that,without considering moral hazard,under the condition of complete information,the leader enterprises need to pay a certain cost to encourage the positive efforts of the alliance enterprises.As a result,the increase of the effort level will greatly improve the production level;in the case of moral hazard neutral,although the effort level of the alliance enterprises may not be monitored by the alliance enterprises or supervision agencies,the moral hazard insurance will not be an obstacle to the development of virtual enterprise,so the optimal interval incentive method can be used;the design process of incentive contract is based on the information collection of the buyer and the seller.The information collection helps to judge the risk preference of the buyer,and then determine the division of labor within the virtual enterprise and how to create the contract incentive.The results show that in the design process of incentive contract,the choice of contract model and the trade-off between contract cost and benefit are the core and keys of the design.

关 键 词：道德风险 激励契约 虚拟企业 盟员企业 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]