中国民营企业创新路径研究——基于实际控制人直接持股的视角  

Research on the Innovation Path of Chinese Private Enterprises——From the Perspective of Actual Controllers’ Directly Holding Stocks

作　　者：范瀚文 尹良富[2] FAN Han-wen;YIN Liang-fu(School of Economics,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,030006;Institute of Economics,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,200020)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学经济学院,030006 [2]上海社会科学院经济研究所,200020

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2021年第11期89-99,共11页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“科技创新供给侧高质量发展路径及政策研究”(批准号:20YJA630002)的阶段性成果之一。

摘　　要：理论上,实际控制人直接持有民营上市公司的股份有利于缓解代理问题并改善公司治理。本文以2009-2019年中国沪深A股民营上市公司为样本,实证检验实际控制人直接持股对企业创新的影响。研究发现,实际控制人直接持股能够促进民营企业创新投入,且直接持股越多促进作用越强。当企业融资约束程度较高、处于市场化水平较低的地区以及所属行业为高技术产业时,实际控制人直接持股的促进作用更强。机制检验表明,这种促进作用是节约创新资源和提升创新意愿的共同结果。进一步分析发现,实际控制人直接持股最终也提高了民营企业创新产出的总量、效率以及独立性。研究结论为促进民营上市公司创新能力的提升提供了启示。Theoretically, the actual controller’s directly holding shares of the private listed company is conducive to alleviate the agency problem and improve corporate governance. With a data set of Chinese A-share private listed companies from 2009 to 2019, this paper empirically tests the impact of actual controllers’ directly holding stocks on corporate innovation. It is found that the actual controller’s direct shareholding can promote R&D investment, and the more direct shareholding, the stronger the promotion effect. When the degree of financing constraints is high, the level of marketization is low and the industry is high-tech industry, then the promotion effect is stronger. The mechanism test shows that the promotion is a combined result of saving innovation resources and enhancing innovation willingness. Finally, the actual controller’s directly holding stocks ultimately improves the total amount, efficiency and independence of innovation output. The results have implications for promoting the innovation ability of private listed companies.

关 键 词：实际控制人 直接持股 代理成本 企业创新 民营企业 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]