收购价格机制对不同组织模式下订单农业供应链运作的影响  

The Influence of the Contract Mechanisms on the Operation of Contract-farming Supply Chains under Different Organizational Modes

作　　者：冯颖 高龙天 陈苏雨 张炎治[1] FENG Ying;GAO Long-tian;CHEN Su-yu;ZHANG Yan-zhi(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学经济管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《系统工程》2021年第6期81-89,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(18YJC630032);中央高校基本科研业务经费项目(2017WB14);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2015SJD430)。

摘　　要：基于多Agent系统仿真,设计了一个包含两条"公司+X+农户"型订单农业供应链的仿真实验,考虑供应链间的链际竞争,探究了收购价格机制对不同组织模式下订单农业供应链运作的影响。围绕"公司+农户"和"公司+合作社+农户"两种典型的组织模式,考虑每种模式下的两条供应链分别采用"随行就市,保底收购"、市场价收购和固定价收购三种价格机制的两两组合,实现链间收购价格机制组合的模拟仿真。结果表明:"公司+农户"模式下,较之其它两种收购价格机制,"随行就市,保底收购"能够降低农户因市场价波动面临的市场风险,并降低公司因农户的违约行为面临的损失;"公司+合作社+农户"模式下,考虑合作社与公司进行Nash协商谈判,发现:任意价格机制下,合作社与公司的谈判均会提升谈判的固定/保底价格,进而提高农户生产的积极性及其获得的期望利润;同时,固定/保底价格的提升会削弱不同价格机制的差异性。最后,对两种组织模式进行横向对比,发现,"随行就市,保底收购"机制下,引入合作社仅使农户的利润获得有限的小幅提升,这源于此价格机制和合作社的叠加作用效果被削弱了。Based on the multi-agent simulation, an experiment which includes two "company+X+farmer" contract-farming supply chains is designed. Considering the inter-chain competition between supply chains, we explore the influence of the contract price mechanisms on the operation of contract-farming supply chains under different organizational modes. Specifically, we focus on two typical organizational modes, i.e.,"company+farmer" and "company+cooperative+farmer" and consider the pairwise combination of three purchasing price mechanisms, i.e., protection price, market price and fixed price under each mode to realize the simulation of the price mechanism combination between chains. The results show that compared with the other two purchasing price mechanisms, the protection price mechanism can not only reduce the farmer’s market risk due to the market price fluctuation, but also reduce the company’s loss due to the farmer’s default behavior under the "company+farmer" mode. Then, cooperatives are introduced to consider Nash negotiation between cooperatives and companies under the"company+cooperative+farmer" mode. We find that negotiations between the cooperatives and the companies can increase the fixed/protection price at any purchasing price mechanism, which further increases the farmers’ output and profits. Meanwhile, the increase of the fixed/protection price will weaken the differences between different price mechanisms. Finally, the two organization modes are compared horizontally. We find the introduction of cooperatives can only bring limited and small increase to farmers’ profits under protection price. This stems from the fact that the combined effect of the price mechanism and the cooperatives has been weakened.

关 键 词：多AGENT仿真 订单农业 组织模式 收购价格机制 链际竞争 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]