基于博弈论的滑坡灾害时空信息分流激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism of Spatiotemporal Information Diversion of Landslide Disaster Based on Game Theory

作　　者：胡娟 王霄[1] 张译 刘佳林 HU Juan;WANG Xiao;ZHANG Yi;LIU Jialin(The Electrical Engineering College,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学电气工程学院,贵阳550025

出　　处：《微处理机》2021年第6期18-22,共5页Microprocessors

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61861007);国家自然科学基金(61640014);贵州省科学技术基金(黔科合基础-ZK[2021]一般303);贵州省工业攻关项目(黔科合支撑[2019]2152);黔科合人才团队([2015]4014);物联网理论与应用案例库(KCALK201708);自动化专业卓越工程师计划(ZYS2015004)。

摘　　要：为解决滑坡灾害时空信息在数据采集传输阶段的蜂窝系统流量过载、网络拥塞等问题,结合机会网络的特征,以贵州毕节地质滑坡灾害监测点为例,构建机会网络模型,提出一种基于博弈论的滑坡灾害时空信息分流激励机制。该机制利用三次讨价还价博弈,防止恶意节点的虚假报价,激励自私节点之间的合作。仿真实验结果显示,所提出的机制能够有效地激励成员间的协作,在恶意节点比例较高的初始条件下,亦能发挥出较好的协作性能和网络传输效果。In order to solve the problems of cellular system traffic overload and network congestion in the stage of data collection and transmission of landslide spatiotemporal information,combined with the characteristics of opportunistic network,taking Bijie geological landslide disaster monitoring point in Guizhou as an example,an opportunistic network model was built,and an incentive mechanism of landslide spatiotemporal information diversion based on game theory is proposed.The mechanism uses three bargaining games to prevent false quotations from malicious nodes and encourage cooperation between selfish nodes.The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively stimulate the cooperation among members,and can also play a better cooperation performance and network transmission effect under the initial condition of high proportion of malicious nodes.

关 键 词：机会网络 信息分流 激励机制 博弈论 自私节点 滑坡灾害 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]