建筑行业上市公司董事会独立性与合谋掏空行为的关系研究  

Research on the Relationship between Independence of Board of Directors and Collusion Tunneling in Construction Industry

作　　者：王秋菲[1] 宫晶华 WANG Qiufei;GONG Jinghua(School of Management,Shenyang Jianzhu University,Shenyang 110168,China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第5期492-496,524,共6页Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC790167)。

摘　　要：以2014—2018年建筑行业上市公司为样本,对大股东持股水平与合谋掏空的关系、董事会独立性与合谋掏空的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:大股东持股水平的提高会显著增加合谋掏空行为;董事会独立性作为公司内部治理的重要机制抑制了大股东和管理层之间的合谋掏空。该实证研究结果为建筑行业重视董事会独立性、全面认识大股东在公司治理中的影响以及应对合谋掏空行为提供了理论依据。Based on the samples of Listed Companies in the construction industry from 2014 to 2018,this paper empirically studies the relationship between the shareholding level of major shareholders and collusive tunneling,and the relationship between the independence of the board of directors and collusive tunneling.The results show that:the improvement of the shareholding level of major shareholders will significantly increase the collusive tunneling behavior;the independence of the board of directors as an important mechanism of corporate internal governance inhibits the collusive tunneling between major shareholders and management.The empirical results provide a theoretical basis for the construction industry to attach importance to the independence of the board of directors,to fully understand the influence of major shareholders in corporate governance and how to deal with collusive tunneling.

关 键 词：合谋掏空 大股东持股水平 董事会独立性 建筑行业 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.90[经济管理—国民经济]