基于内生视角的股权激励与企业研发投入研究  

A research on equity incentive and enterprise R&D investment from the endogenous perspective

作　　者：邱强[1,2] 卜华[2] Qiu Qiang;Bu Hua(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Forestry University,Nanjing 210037,Jiangsu,China;School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221008,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210037 [2]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221008

出　　处：《科研管理》2021年第11期200-208,共9页Science Research Management

基　　金：江苏省社科应用研究精品工程财经发展专项(18SCB-46,2018.06.01—2019.09.30)。

摘　　要：本文采用2006—2013年期间实施股权激励的公司为研究样本,以逆米尔斯比率作为管理层私人信息的计量变量,采用Heckman方法估计管理层私人信息,股权激励实施对研发投入的影响。研究结果发现:管理层私人信息与企业研发投入显著相关,即企业研发投入与股权激励实施具有内生性;在控制内生性基础上股权激励实施决策与之后三年企业的研发投入相关,即实施股权激励企业的管理层倾向于在之后的三年中增加企业研发投入。但结合样本选择模型结果,高管持股比例高以及高管薪酬高的企业越倾向于实施股权激励,说明实施股权激励是内部人控制的结果。因此,研发投入增加并不能被视为代理问题的缓解,实质是代理问题的表现结果,即激励效应与企业研发投入显著正相关是企业代理问题的表现结果,并非缓解企业代理问题。The separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises leads to information asymmetry between management and shareholders. It is costly or difficult for shareholders to monitor management. Management has incentives to implement behaviors that maximize the benefit of themselves rather than the profit of shareholders. Consequently, the agency problem arises, which will affect management investment behavior, especially R&D investment behavior. In the case of serious agency problems, management may reduce investment in high-risk investment projects, such as research and development. There are two main reasons why this paper analyzes the impact of the implementation of equity incentive plan on R&D investment of enterprises. First, technological innovation is an important driving force for economic growth, which is considered to be the input of human and financial resources derived from R&D. Second, with high levels of uncertainty and information asymmetry, R&D investment is a powerful tool for testing governance measures such as equity incentive. The research in this paper is helpful to give an insight into the endogenous mechanism of management equity incentive to promote R&D investment, and it is of great significance to further improve the equity incentive mechanism and promote enterprise R&D activities to enhance the innovation capability of enterprises.The standard principal-agent model ignores the endogenous problems of R&D activities and equity incentives, which leads to inconsistent conclusions of empirical tests. Some scholars(Barker and Muller(2002), Wu and Tu(2007), Chen Linrong(2018), Chen Xiaodong and Zhou Jianan(2014)) believe that equity incentives can promote R&D investment of enterprises. Some scholars research shows that there is no clear correlation between CEO equity incentives and R&D investment(Balkin et al.(2000)). O′Connor and Rafferty(2012) believe that R&D investment is affected by many factors, in addition after controlling variables, the relationship between corporate governance an

关 键 词：股权激励 研发投入 代理问题 内生性 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]