N-策略休假排队系统中异质信息顾客策略分析  

Analysis of Heterogeneous Information Customer Behavior in M/M/1 Queueing Systems with N-policy

作　　者：马庆庆 刘维奇 李继红[2] MA Qing-qing;LIU Wei-qi;LI Ji-hong(School of Management Science and Engineering, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China;Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;School of Finance, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山西太原030006 [2]山西大学管理与决策研究所,山西太原030006 [3]山西财经大学金融学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第11期40-46,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：山西省回国留学人员科研教研资助项目(HGKY2019060);山西省“1331工程”重点创新团队建设计划(1331KIRT)。

摘　　要：本文研究N-策略休假M/M/1排队系统中的异质信息顾客策略和社会最优收益。来到系统的顾客分为两类,第一类顾客有系统信息,加入系统前知道服务员的状态和系统中顾客数;第二类顾客没有系统信息,加入系统前既不知道服务员的状态,也不知道系统中顾客数。利用粒子群优化算法,分析了两类顾客的最优策略行为和最优社会收益。结果表明,最优社会收益随着转换门限N的增大而减小,随着v和系统负载p的增大而增大。并且,第一类顾客的比例越大,社会收益越大。This study considers the strategy of heterogeneous information customer and the optimal social welfare in an M/M/1 queue with N-policy.The arriving customers are divided into two types.Customers of Type I have all the information of the system,knowing the server state and the queue length upon arrival;customers of Type II have no information of the system,knowing neither the server state nor the queue length upon arrival.Using Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm,the customer optimal strategic behavior is illustrated.The results indicate that the optimal social welfare decreases with N,but increases with v andρ.Besides,the larger the proportion of customers of Type I,the higher the social welfare.

关 键 词：N-策略休假排队系统 异质信息顾客 收益-成本结构 顾客行为 

分 类 号：O226[理学—运筹学与控制论]