放松卖空管制能够抑制并购商誉泡沫吗?  

Can Relaxing Short Selling Constraints Inhibit M&A Goodwill Bubbles?

作　　者：孙诗璐 张斐燕 郑建明[2] 刘艳霞 SUN Shilu;ZHANG Feiyan;ZHENG Jianming;LIU Yanxia(College of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Chemical Technology;Business School,University of International Business and Economics)

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学经济管理学院,北京100029 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《金融研究》2021年第11期189-206,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“一带一路”倡议与全球经济治理研究(项目批准号:17AZD010);财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才培养项目;北京化工大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(项目批准号:ZY2112、ZY2113)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以我国放松卖空管制作为切入点,系统检验了其对并购商誉泡沫的影响。研究发现,放松卖空管制之后,超额商誉显著下降,同时商誉资产也显著下降,且该效应在民营控股公司中更显著;机制检验发现,卖空通过吸引更多分析师跟踪、增加对管理者的激励来抑制商誉泡沫;进一步研究发现,在市场化水平较高、行业竞争度较低的情形下,卖空机制对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更强。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和并购商誉领域的文献,并为以市场导向原则化解并购商誉泡沫提供了新思路和新范式。Goodwill bubbles generated by the M&A boom have recently become an important financial risk factor.The economic consequences of such a bubble for listed firms and the capital market as a whole have raised concerns among shareholders and regulatory authorities.Thus,preventing goodwill bubbles has attracted much attention from practitioners and academics.Managers are deeply involved in the entire M&A process,directly participating in the formulation and implementation of M&A plans and being the main decision makers in the selection and valuation of M&A targets.Therefore,managers’motivation directly impacts M&A,including the scale and amount of goodwill.Principal-agent theory holds that agency conflicts in M&A activities cause executives to pay more attention to their private interests at the expense of shareholder wealth created by M&A activities.Furthermore,the existence of agency problems drives executives to rely on their information and decision-making advantages to increase the frequency and scale of M&A and even pay a higher premium to complete M&A,which leads to the overestimation of goodwill.This leads to the question of how to prevent goodwill bubbles.In addition to internal control quality and external auditing,the innovation of basic market mechanisms is required to restrain goodwill valuation bubbles.The implementation of a margin trading mechanism is an innovation in China’s stock market and opens the door to short selling.Research on short selling predominantly focuses on two areas.The first is the effect of short selling on the liquidity,stability,and efficiency of stock prices.The second is the effect of short selling on corporate financial decisions,such as earnings management,investment policy,and firm innovations.Studies generally indicate that short selling has the function of price discovery and can be an effective external corporate governance mechanism that reduces earnings management,improves the efficiency of corporate investment,and enhances innovation expenditure and output.However,fe

关 键 词：卖空 并购 商誉泡沫 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]