临时CEO继任与企业创新投入水平——基于中国上市公司的实证分析  

Interim CEO Succession and Firms’ Innovation Investment Intensity——Empirical Research on Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：连燕玲 郑伟伟 刘依琳 况琳 LIAN Yan-ling;ZHENG Wei-wei;LIU Yi-lin;KUANG Lin(Faculty of Economics and Management,East China Normal Unirersity,Shanghai 200062,China;Naveen Jindal School of Management,University of Texas at Dallas,Richardson 75080,USA;Jiangxi Branch,China Derelopment Bank,Nanchang 330000,China)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学经济与管理学部,上海200062 [2]德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校纳文金达尔管理学院,理查德森75080 [3]国家开发银行江西省分行,南昌330000

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2021年第6期124-141,共18页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“制度期望、投资决策与私营企业成长机制研究”(71972073);国家社会科学基金面上项目“家族控制、合作偏好与私营企业成长机制研究”(18BGL088)。

摘　　要：临时CEO继任逐渐成为当前不确定性商业环境下组织应对突发性领导权更替的重要策略。聘任临时CEO会如何影响组织的长期投资决策是值得探讨的重要现实和理论问题。本文探讨了临时CEO继任与企业创新投入水平之间的关系,并分析了CEO特征、高管团队(TMT)特征、外部环境特征对上述两者之间关系的调节机制。利用2007—2017年我国上市公司数据进行实证检验,结果表明:临时CEO继任后存在短期主义视野,对企业创新投入水平具有负向影响;CEO学术背景与CEO金融背景能够削弱临时CEO继任与创新投入水平之间的负向关系;当高管薪酬激励较高或党委书记是TMT中的一员,临时CEO继任与创新投入水平之间的负向关系会被减弱;较为完善的地区制度环境或较高的产业竞争强度也能够削弱临时CEO继任与创新投入水平之间的负向关系。上述结论补充和完善了关于CEO继任研究的已有成果,也为企业在面临CEO更替危机时选择合适的临时继任者提供若干建议。Interim CEO succession has gradually become an important strategy for organizations to respond to sudden leadership changes in the current uncertain business environment. How the appointment of interim CEO affects the organization’s long-term investment decisions is an important practical and theoretical issue worthy of discussion. It discussed the relationship between interim CEO succession and firm innovation investment intensity,and analyzed the moderating effects of CEO characteristics,TMT characteristics,and external environment characteristics on the above mentioned relationship. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2017,it mainly draws the following conclusions:because of myopic vision,interim CEO succession has a negative impact on innovation investment intensity;CEO academic background and CEO financial background weaken the negative relationship between interim CEO succession and innovation investment intensity;when the executive compensation incentive is high or the Party secretary is a member of TMT,the negative relationship between interim CEO succession and innovation investment is weakened;a more complete regional institutional environment or a higher industrial competition also weaken the negative relationship between interim CEO succession and innovation investment intensity. The above conclusions complement and improve the existing research results on CEO succession,and also provide some suggestions for enterprises to choose appropriate interim successors when facing the crisis of CEO succession.

关 键 词：临时CEO继任 创新投入水平 CEO特征 TMT特征 外部环境特征 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]